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rms with relatively large
amounts of CDS contracts outstanding, and those with \No Restructuring" contracts,
are more likely to be adversely a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I. Introduction
Credit default swaps (CDS), which are insurance-type contracts that oer investors protection
against default by a debtor, are arguably the most controversial nancial innovation of the
past two decades. They were praised by some market observers such as former Federal
Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, who argued that \these increasingly complex nancial
instruments have contributed, especially over the recent stressful period, to the development of
a far more exible, ecient, and hence resilient nancial system than existed just a quarter-
century ago."1 However, they also came in for strong criticism from several well-known
market practitioners, particularly after the global nancial crisis, which had its origins in July
2007. Warren Buett, the much acclaimed investor, weighed against derivatives in general
by describing them as \time bombs, for the parties that deal in them and the economic
system" and went to conclude that \in my view, derivatives are nancial weapons of mass
destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."2 In a similar
vein, George Soros, a legendary hedge fund investor argued that \CDS are toxic instruments
whose use ought to be strictly regulated."3 Which of these conclusions is valid? Although
one can debate this question based on theoretical arguments, the issue can only be resolved
by empirical testing in specic contexts with clearly stated hypothesis that can be refuted.
Our purpose in this paper is to present a careful empirical examination along these lines.
Despite the concerns expressed by regulators as well as market participants, the CDS
market grew by leaps and bounds from about $0.9 trillion at the end of 2001 to a high of
about $62 trillion at the end of 2007, measured by notional amount outstanding, next only
to interest rate derivatives. Although the CDS market shrank considerably during the global
nancial crisis, it nevertheless stood at $26 trillion by December 2010. Indeed, during this
period, CDS trading was introduced in countries including China and India. At the same
time, CDS played a prominent role during the credit crisis of 2007-2008 and the European
sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2011. In particular, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the
collapse of Bear Stearns and AIG were closely related to CDS trading. In spite of misgivings
about the role of CDS in potentially destabilizing markets, their role as indicators of credit
quality has, in fact, expanded. CDS spreads are widely quoted by market practitioners as
well as regulators, who have built them into their assessment of credit risks at both the level
of each corporate debtor, as well as the aggregate level of a sector and the overall sovereign
1Greenspan, Alan. 2004. \Economic Flexibility." Speech given to the Her Majesty's Treasury Enterprise
Conference, London, January 26, 2004.
2Berkshire Hathaway Annual Report for 2002.
3Wall Street Journal, March 24, 2009.
1
risk of a country.
Many of the issues mentioned in the context of derivatives, in general, have also been
raised in the specic case of CDS. The generic arguments about the deleterious eects of
derivatives, as a group, rely on market mechanisms such as the possibility of market manipu-
lation, accounting fraud, pressure on posting collateral and their liquidity consequences, and
the credit risk of counter-parties. These arguments challenge the hitherto accepted notion
that derivatives are redundant assets, as assumed in most pricing and hedging models, and
hence have no eect, adverse or otherwise, on the price of the underlying asset or the integrity
of markets.
Apart from the above concerns that apply to all derivatives, in principle, CDS contracts
are somewhat dierent from many other derivatives for one important reason: Buyers of CDS
protection can inuence the nancial decisions of the entities they reference, such as rms,
and, indirectly, the credit risk of the claims they issue. This possibility is contrary to the
\redundancy" assumption in structural models of credit risk along the lines of Merton (1974),
that default risk is principally driven by leverage and asset volatility. In the spirit of that
framework, CDS are regarded as \side-bets" on the value of the rm, and hence, have no eect
on the credit risk associated with the individual claims issued by the rm. In particular, in
such models, CDS trading does not aect the probability of bankruptcy, or indeed even the
possibility of a credit downgrade.
In contrast to the redundancy argument, illustrative evidence from corporate restructuring
and bankruptcy suggests that CDS positions play an important role in the case of distressed
rms, especially just prior to bankruptcy. To cite one such instance, CIT Group attempted to
work out its debt to avoid bankruptcy from late 2008 to mid-2009. In the event, however, some
debt-holders, including Goldman Sachs (which had also bought CDS protection on the rm)
rejected the rm's exchange oer.4 CIT Group eventually led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on
November 1, 2009.5 Hu and Black (2008) call such debt-holders whose exposures are insured
with CDS \empty creditors," meaning that they are creditors with an economic interest in
the rm's claims, but no risk alignment with the other bondholders who do not enjoy such
protection.6 Along the same lines, in an op-ed piece, Henry Hu, one of the coauthors of Hu
4See, for example, \Goldman Purchase Puts CDS in Focus," Financial Times, October
4, 2009. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a5dcac30-b10f-11de-b06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1UM2DNBjJ
\Goldman Sachs May Reap $1 Billion in CIT Bankruptcy", Bloomberg, October 5, 2009.
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=agRAQzb5M3cg
5Appendix A lists several other cases of a similar nature, demonstrating that the example cited is not that
unique.
6The use of equity derivatives such as options or swaps in the context of equities creates the analogous
issue of \empty voters" who enjoy voting rights in the rm, but without any nancial risk, by breaking the
link between cash ow rights and control rights.
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and Black (2008), named Goldman Sachs as AIG's empty creditor shortly before becoming
the director of the SEC's Division of Risk, Strategy, and Financial Innovation.7 In a similar
vein, when Delphi Corporation led for bankruptcy on October 8, 2005, the total amount of
CDS contracts outstanding was roughly thirty times the face value of the bonds outstanding
and led to a \squeeze," when the default event called for physical delivery of the bonds. It is
highly likely that many creditors had become empty creditors.8
The empty creditor concern highlighted by Hu and Black (2008) is formally modeled by
Bolton and Oehmke (2011).9 Their model predicts that bondholders will usually choose to
\over-insure" their credit exposure by buying CDS protection, and thus, becoming empty
creditors. Consequently, they have dierent economic interests from other bondholders and
are less willing to negotiate to restructure the debt when the rm is under stress, and are even
willing to push the rm into bankruptcy, since their total payos may be larger in that event.
A similar argument applies to events that are less extreme and more common than default
such as a rating downgrade: Credit rating agencies may anticipate the potential increase
in credit risk and take such action. Often, a rating downgrade is the rst stage of credit
deterioration towards eventual default.
An alternative channel through which creditor behavior in the presence of CDS protection
may adversely aect the credit risk of a rm is through the reduction of monitoring activity
by lenders who are empty creditors. Such creditors may have diminished incentives to expend
resources to monitor the performance of the rm; this, in turn, may lead to lower information
quality, higher risk-taking, and higher bankruptcy incidence.10 It is important to distinguish
between these two channels of increased credit risk emanating from the empty creditor phe-
nomenon. The issue has great relevance to the current regulatory debate regarding CDS
contracts and the relative importance of the two channels merits scrutiny. There are several
obvious dierences between the two channels. First, the increase in bankruptcy risk through
the \restructuring" channel is positively related to the amount of CDS outstanding, but not
necessarily through the \monitoring" channel. In the former case, the greater the amount of
CDS outstanding, the greater is the potential for the stando regarding restructuring, whereas
in the latter case, zero monitoring is the worst possible scenario and lenders cannot do any
damage below that level. Second, the \restructuring" eect of CDS trading on bankruptcy
risk is expected to be more severe for CDS that exclude restructuring as credit event. This
7http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123933166470307811.html
8Following this episode, the New York Fed launched its rst round of regulatory actions on CDS in
September 2005. It requested major CDS dealers to clear the backlog of unsettled contracts.
9Other studies such as Due (2007) also oer related analyses.
10See, for example, Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Parlour and Plantin (2008), for this line of argument.
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prediction is unique to the restructuring channel.11
An additional issue of interest is the ex-ante behavior of lenders to a rm, especially
banks. On the one hand, the existence of CDS contracts may render a bank more willing
to lend, due to the possibility of risk mitigation and enhanced bargaining power through
the CDS contract. On the other hand, banks with relationships to the rm may have long-
run reputation concerns about becoming empty creditors in a dynamic setting. Further, the
greater the number of lenders, the more severe the problems of coordination in a stressed
situation, when a workout may be necessary. To study this issue further, we explore how
CDS trading aects lending relationships, and, in particular, the number of lenders, after the
introduction of CDS trading. If bankruptcy risk increases with the number of lenders, this is
an indirect channel for CDS trading to aect bankruptcy risk. This is also consistent with the
empty creditor hypothesis as lenders tend to think they are non-pivotal in a multiple-lender
structure.
We test our hypotheses using a comprehensive data set on CDS trading since the inception
of CDS market for corporate names in 1997. It should be emphasized that it is dicult to
retrieve accurate data on the introduction of CDS from a single source, since CDS trading
does not take place on centralized exchanges. Indeed, even the central clearing of CDS is
a relatively recent phenomenon. Our identication of the launch date relies, of necessity,
on multiple data sources including GFI Inc., the largest global interdealer broker with the
most extensive records of CDS trades and quotes, CreditTrade, a major intermediary espe-
cially in the early stages of the CDS market, and Markit, a data disseminator and vendor,
which provides daily quotes from major institutions. Our combined data set covers 901 CDS
introductions from 1997 to 2009 for North American names. The list of bankruptcies for
North American rms is comprehensively constructed from major data sources such as New
Generation Research, the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Database, Moody's Annual Reports on
Bankruptcy and Recovery, and the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List. Over the
same time period, we record bankruptcy lings by 1,628 rms, of which 60 had CDS trading
prior to bankruptcies. Since bankruptcy is a relatively rare event for rms, we also include
data on credit rating downgrades, of which we nd 3,863 in our data set. The data on credit
ratings are from S&P.
Our main empirical challenge is the potential endogeneity of CDS trading due to the
11In results not reported here to conserve space, we also examined the validity of an alternative mechanism
through which CDS trading may aect the credit risk of a rm. If a shock causes the CDS to become overpriced
relative to the bonds issued by the rm, this overpricing may spill over to the bond market, increasing the
cost of debt for the rm. This may aect the ability of the rm to renance its debt by increasing its cost
and in extreme cases, aecting its ability to pay o the bondholders.
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possibility that rms with greater future credit risk deterioration are selected for CDS trading.
In other words, there could be unobserved omitted variables that drive both selection of rms
for CDS trading and bankruptcy risk. We address this concern in several ways. First, we
select rms by their distance-to-default from the Merton (1974) structural model and match
rms with and without CDS traded on them, to examine the eect of CDS trading on this
matched sample. This partially controls for the credit risk prior to CDS trading. Second,
we construct a model to predict CDS trading for individual rms. This model allows us to
undertake a dierence-in-dierence comparison and a propensity score matching analysis for
rms with and without CDS trading. Third, we use the two-stage Heckman correction for the
selection of rms with CDS traded. In the rst stage, we run a probit model for CDS trading.
In the second stage, we estimate the probability of bankruptcy subject to the likelihood of
CDS trading from the rst stage.
We nd that the introduction of CDS on a rm increases the likelihood of both credit
downgrades and bankruptcy, after controlling for variables suggested by structural models.
The eect of CDS trading is both statistically signicant and economically large. For our
sample rms, the credit rating declines by about half a notch, on average, in the next two years
after the introduction of CDS trading. In a similar vein, the probability of bankruptcy more
than doubles, from 0.14% to 0.33%, once the CDS starts trading. The positive relationship
between CDS trading and bankruptcy risk is signicant after controlling for the propensity
of CDS trading. The Heckman correction results show that the eect of CDS introduction on
bankruptcy risk is robust to the selection of a rm for CDS trading. Moreover, we nd that
the eect of CDS trading goes beyond the inuence of the rating downgrade itself.
We also distinguish empirically between the dierent channels through which the empty
creditor phenomenon manifests itself. Specically, our analysis separates the restructuring
channel from the monitoring channel. We also document that the eects of CDS trading are
stronger when the the number of outstanding CDS contracts is larger, and when the CDS
contract has a \No Restructuring" credit event clause. In sum, rather than insuring against
borrower default, CDS can actually indirectly cause borrower default. This \tail wagging
dog" eect of CDS trading is important to take into account in policy discussions of the eect
of CDS trading.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses related
studies in the literature and places our research in context. Section III presents the motivation
for our hypotheses and states them explicitly. The construction of our data-set and our
empirical methods are discussed in Section IV. Section V examines closely the selection of
rms for CDS trading, and incorporates this issue explicitly into our analysis of the likelihood
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of rating downgrades and bankruptcy ling. Section VI explores further the empty creditor
problem through the restructuring and monitoring channels by which CDS trading aects
bankruptcy risk. Section VII concludes.
II. Literature Review
Our study is related to three dierent strands of the literature. The rst analyzes the implica-
tions of CDS trading, and more broadly, the introduction of credit risk transfer mechanisms
for creditors and the rms themselves. The second related literature is on the wide array
of models of bankruptcy prediction. The third examines the eects of CDS trading on the
relationship between creditors and rms, including the role of monitoring and information
asymmetry.
A. CDS Trading and Credit Risk Transfer
Duee and Zhou (2001) provide an early discussion of the benets of CDS contracts as risk
transfer tools, but also express caution on the potential downside of CDS trading for rms.
They model the impact of introduction of CDS contracts from the perspective of creditors,
particularly banks. The banks' information advantage regarding borrower credit quality can
cause both adverse selection and moral hazard concerns. In particular, CDS trading may
reduce other types of risk-sharing, such as secondary loan sales, with ambiguous welfare
consequences. Morrison (2005) argues that CDS can cause disintermediation as banks may
not have incentives to monitor borrowers as closely, once their exposures are hedged with
CDS.12 Allen and Carletti (2006) show that credit risk transfer can be benecial when banks
face systematic demand for liquidity. However, when they face idiosyncratic liquidity risk and
hedge this risk in the inter-bank market, credit risk transfer can be detrimental to welfare.
Further, such hedging via CDS may lead to contagion between the banking and the real
sectors and increase the risk of nancial crises.
Several papers have investigated the impact of loan sales, an alternative tool for credit
risk transfer, on the creditor's monitoring incentive. Gorton and Pennachhi (1995) focus on
12Arping (2004) shows that credit risk transfer alters the incentives of lenders and borrowers. With the
shelter of the credit protection, lenders may be less willing to monitor the borrowers. The problem can be
mitigated by setting the length of CDS protection less than the maturity of the project. Thompson (2007)
extends the Duee and Zhou (2001) formulation by allowing for informational asymmetry in the CDS market
and relaxing the maturity mismatch assumption. Then, it is unclear whether the use of CDS to transfer credit
risk would be benecial, since it would depend on the nature of the moral hazard problem, the relationship
between the bank and the borrower, the cost of loan sales and the cost of capital.
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the moral hazard problem after loan sales. They conclude that banks can overcome the moral
hazard problem by continuing to hold a fraction of the loan, and hence, have \skin in the
game." Parlour and Plantin (2008) emphasize the impact of a liquid loan sale market on
bank's ex ante incentive to monitor the debtor rm. They provide conditions under which a
liquid credit risk transfer market can be socially inecient. Parlour and Winton (2011) focus
on a bank's decision to lay o credit risk through loan sales versus CDS protection. They
explicitly present eciency implications in terms of risk transfer and monitoring, and suggest
that, overall, CDS as a risk transfer mechanism are more likely to undermine monitoring.
Beyhaghi and Massoud (2011) nd that banks are more likely to hedge with CDS when
monitoring costs are high.
Notwithstanding the insightful theoretical work cited above, there is a lack of direct em-
pirical evidence as to what extent CDS trading aects bankruptcy risk through the creditor's
monitoring incentives and related channels. The only existing related evidence is somewhat
indirect. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) document that CDS trading does not signicantly ben-
et rms in terms of their cost of debt, except for safe and transparent rms. Hirtle (2009)
shows that CDS trading increases bank credit supply and improves credit terms for large
loans. Purnanandam (2011) discusses how the originate-to-distribute model reduces loan
quality and increases bankruptcy risk. Das, Kalimipalli, and Nayak (2011) nd that CDS
trading hurts the bond market.13 After the inception of CDS trading, there is greater pricing
error and lower liquidity in the bond market. However, Saretto and Tookes (2011) show that
CDS trading aects the corporate capital structure: Firms with CDS traded on them are able
to maintain greater leverage and borrow at longer maturities.
There are several recent papers discussing the CDS-bond basis. For example, Bai and
Collin-Dufresne (2010) investigate cross-sectional variation in the CDS-bond basis during the
crisis period. Many other works, such as Tang and Yan (2011), focus on the determinants
of the CDS spread. Giglio (2011) and Huang, Zhou, and Zhu (2009) measure the impact
of systemic risk based on information contained in CDS spreads. Based on the recently
developed \latent liquidity" measure for corporate bonds, Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam, and
Mahanti (2011) nd a liquidity spillover eect from the CDS market to the corporate bond
market. They also provide empirical evidence on the impact of the limits to arbitrage on the
pricing of credit risk and the CDS-bond basis.
CDS spreads can sometimes be misleading and excessively high, sending out false signals
about rm performance, and thus accentuating the stress faced by the rm, and buttressing
13Boehmer, Chava, and Tookes (2010) document a negative impact of CDS trading on equity liquidity and
prices.
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the need for additional capital.14 Stanton and Wallace (2011) nd that the price levels for
the AAA ABX.HE index CDS (a CDS contract based on asset-backed securities with a AAA
credit rating) in 2009 are inconsistent with any reasonable forecast of the future default
performance of the underlying loans. Moreover, changes in the CDS spreads are only weakly
related to the credit performance of the underlying loans. Their nding casts serious doubts
on the practice of using the CDS for marking-to-market purposes. However, the excessively
high CDS spreads are conceivably driven by the strong demand and the limited supply of
credit protection, without regard to the underlying risk itself. In such cases, if the buyers'
demand is not satised, the CDS price spike could have feedback eects on rm value. In a
related paper, Hortacsu, Matvos, Syverson, and Venkataraman (2011) nd that increases in
GM's CDS spreads result in a drop in the resale prices of its cars at auctions.
At a more general level, there is evidence from the equity market that derivatives trading
can aect the pricing of the underlying asset.15 However, the general conclusions drawn from
the equity derivatives market may not be applicable to CDS and the underlying credit risk
due to several major dierences between the two types of instruments. First, CDS traders
can directly inuence rm operations, if they are also bond holders, especially when the rm
is stressed.16 Second, the payo from a CDS is linked to a specic corporate event (default),
while that of equity options is related to the level of stock prices. Further, bankruptcy is an
irreversible event, that can occur as a \jump to default" unlike the continuous movement of
stock prices. Third, CDS are also traded by credit institutions that may have other devices
to attenuate the impact on bankruptcy risk, such as by bailing out the stressed rm with
additional junior debt. Lastly, CDS contracts are traded over-the-counter, where price trans-
parency and discovery are less clear-cut than exchange traded markets where most equity
derivatives are traded.
B. Bankruptcy Risk
The literature on bankruptcy prediction, which can be dated back to the Z -score model of
Altman (1968) is too vast to survey here. This model and its variants have been widely used
to measure of bankruptcy risk.17 Bharath and Shumway (2008) and Campbell, Hilscher, and
14The Department of Justice investigated Markit, the data aggregator and vendor for price manipulation
in July 2009. http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a3mU4TmtYCww
15See, for example, an early survey by Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992), and Sorescu (2000), an
example of such studies.
16Although bond holders can also buy equity derivatives, CDS provide a direct protection on their exposure.
Moreover, given the maturity of equity derivatives, it is harder for bond holders to hedge their exposure with
equity derivatives.
17Recent additions to the literature include Due, Saita, and Wang (2007), who propose a reduced form
model with good out-of-sample default prediction, Das, Due, Kapadia, and Saita (2007) who nd that
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Szilagyi (2008) discuss the merits of simple bankruptcy prediction models over their more
complicated counter-parts. On the other hand, Longsta, Giesecke, Schaefer, and Strebulaev
(2011) argue that factors suggested by structural models such as volatility and leverage pre-
dict bankruptcy better than other rm variables. Chava, Stefanescu, and Turnbull (2011)
argue that the specication of the default model has a major impact on the predicted loss
distribution. The literature suggests that the merits of using a large number of independent
variables in bankruptcy prediction models are debatable. Hence, we use a same simple hazard
specication, in the spirit of structural models, throughout our analysis.
Another aspect of the bankruptcy problem has received extensive attention in the literature
is the coordination problem between creditors that increases the likelihood of bankruptcy. In
an early paper, Gilson, John, and Lang (1990) show that creditor coordination failure increases
bankruptcies. More recently, Brunner and Krahnen (2008) show that distress workout is less
successful when there are more creditors.
C. CDS and the Lending Relationship
Several papers examine the eect of CDS trading on the incentives and behavior of lenders to
rms, in general, and banks, in particular. Acharya and Johnson (2007, 2010) demonstrate
evidence of insider trading activity in the CDS market. Further, they show that the intensity
of insider trading is related to the number of lenders.18 Their evidence indicates that creditors
often choose to become empty creditors and engage in insider trading in the CDS market.
However, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) nd that bank use of CDS is limited, possibly
due to the lack of liquidity in CDS contracts. Moreover, Hilscher, Pollet, and Wilson (2011)
provide evidence that equity returns lead returns from credit protection at daily and weekly
frequencies, casting doubt on the possibility of insider trading in the CDS market.
CDS could aect bankruptcy risk through two channels associated with the empty creditor
problem. The rst and direct channel is the eect on the willingness to restructure the debt,
whereby creditors (over)insured with CDS break the link between cash ow rights and control
defaults are more clustered than would be implied by conventional credit risk models, and Due, Eckner,
Horel, and Saita (2009) who propose a frailty model, which solves the omitted variable bias. Other follow-up
studies to identify and include important risk factors in bankruptcy risk models include Lando and Nielsen
(2010) and Jorion and Zhang (2009).
18Several other studies also nd that lenders exploit their information advantage. Hale and Santos (2009)
show that if banks exploit their information advantage, rms respond by expanding their borrowing base to
include lenders in the public bond market or adding more bank lenders. Massoud, Nandy, Saunders, and
Song (2011) and Ivashina and Sun (2011) nd that institutional investors trade on their private information
from syndicated loan lending relationships. Gormley, Gupta, and Jha (2011) show that creditor incentives to
monitor borrowers and recover loans aect bankruptcy outcomes.
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rights. Empty creditors are unwilling to restructure the rm even if doing so is ecient for
debt value as they can prot signicantly from their CDS positions. Several theoretical papers
model the empty creditor issue. Bolton and Oehmke (2010) emphasize the ex-ante commit-
ment benet of CDS trading, which relaxes the borrower's debt constraint and decreases the
probability of strategic default. However, the optimal level of CDS protection depends on
the tradeo between the ex-ante commitment benet and the resulting intransigent over-
insured creditors, who may push the rm into an inecient bankruptcy ling. Campello and
Matta (2011) show that the empty creditor problem is a pro-cyclical phenomenon. Based on
their model, CDS over-insurance can minimize the moral hazard problem and maximize the
probability that the rm's investments are protable.
The second and indirect channel of the empty creditor mechanism is reduced monitoring
by creditors who are insured by CDS, and hence, less concerned about the credit risk of the
borrower. Absent monitoring activity by creditors, managers can shift risk from shareholders
to creditors, since this improves shareholder value, and thereby increases the probability of
bankruptcy. Parlour and Plantin (2008) show that if CDS market is liquid, lenders may
initiate too many loans and reduce monitoring, ex post.19 Ashcraft and Santos (2009) also
argue that such reduced monitoring may ultimately lead to a higher cost of debt. Hirtle (2009)
shows that the presence of CDS does not lead to greater credit supply. Norden, Buston,
and Wagner (2011) document lower loan rates for banks that use credit derivatives more
intensively. The recent decline in the absolute priority deviation (APD) during bankruptcy
resolution (see, for example, Bharath, Panchapagesan, and Werner (2010)) is consistent with
tougher creditors and coincides with the development of the CDS market.
Another aspect of the empty creditor mechanism is the reputation eect on a bank. Rela-
tionship banks may choose not to become empty creditors. While Bolton and Oehmke (2011)
use a one-period model that cannot incorporate relationship lending, Gopalan, Nanda, and
Yerramilli (2011) show in a dierent setting that the lead arranger suers reputation dam-
age from borrower bankruptcies due to inadequate screening or monitoring. But since CDS
encourage lending, more banks are willing to lend after introduction of CDS trading. New
banks can become empty creditors. Then empty creditor problem exists even when there are
relationship banks.
In contrast to the restructuring and monitoring channels that derive from the empty
creditor problem associated with covered CDS positions, Che and Sethi (2011) model an
alternative mechanism for the impact of \naked" CDS on economic fundamentals. They
argue that CDS can crowd out debt investors, reduce the rm's debt capacity and increase
19DeMarzo and Due (1999) model security design with risk transfer in a similar setting.
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its costs of debt. They nd that the permitting naked CDS positions may increase the
borrower's bankruptcy risk due to its impact on the cost of debt. Naked CDS trading induces
the most optimistic investors to sell CDS protection, which channels their capital away from
purchasing bonds to investing in collateral to back their naked CDS positions. The remaining
less optimistic bond investors require higher returns. This increase in the cost of debt, in
turn, can increase the borrowing rms' default risk.
The changed incentives of the borrowers with regard to restructuring and monitoring as
a consequence of the empty creditor problem play a critical role in the discussion in the
literature on the impact of CDS trading. However, there is lack of direct empirical evidence
in this regard. Even when information on the proportion of CDS insured debt for a rm is
available, it is hard to distinguish between covered and naked CDS positions. Some recent
research investigates the empty creditor hypothesis from an indirect perspective. Bedendo,
Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2011) examine the distressed rms' decisions regarding out-of-court
restructuring and bankruptcy ling during the global nancial crisis. They nd that CDS
contracts do not signicantly increase the probability of bankruptcy when the rm is already in
distress, although their relatively small sample spans a short time period. Similarly, Peristiani
and Savino (2011) document the higher bankruptcy risk in the presence of CDS during 2008.
III. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
In this section, we present the key insights from the theoretical literature that we use to
motivate the specic hypotheses for our empirical tests. The prior literature has discussed
both direct and indirect mechanisms through which CDS trading aects bankruptcy risk. The
direct mechanism acts to lower the success of debt restructuring due to increased coordination
failures among creditors. The coordination failure can result from the creation of empty
creditors or, simply a larger, more diverse group of creditors. The indirect mechanism causes
an increase in rm risk due to a higher leverage ratio and higher borrowing cost, as a result
of catering to a more heterogeneous group of creditors, some of whom are hedged against the
credit risk of the rm. The higher leverage can result either because of more ecient risk
transfer or lower monitoring by some of the creditors.20 Higher borrowing costs may arise
because of potential feedback eects from the CDS market to the rm's nancing decisions:
a shock to the CDS market as a whole can be transmitted to the rm's bonds by arbitrageurs
20Another channel through which the empty creditor problem may manifest itself is through a reduction
in monitoring by the empty creditors, who no longer derive any benet from such activity. Thus, reduced
monitoring is the attenuated case of the empty creditor problem, and contributes to an increase in the credit
risk of the rm, and in turn, leads to a higher probability of bankruptcy.
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who take advantage of mispricing between the bonds and the CDS.
We use a simple example to illustrate how CDS trading by creditors aects the likelihood
of bankruptcy. The example is intended to convey the basic intuition of the empty creditor
problem and is based on the model of Bolton and Oehmke (2011).
First consider the case where there is no CDS traded on the rm. Assume that creditors
lend X to a rm. If the rm is in nancial distress and consequently declares bankruptcy,
creditors will recover r  X, where r is the recovery rate in bankruptcy. Consider, on the
other hand, that the creditors allow the rm to restructure the debt, since the recovery value
of the assets in bankruptcy is less than its value as a going concern. Suppose the rm oers
the creditors part of the dierence between the going concern value and the recovery value of
the assets in bankruptcy, and agree to pay them say RX, with R > r. Clearly, the creditors
would consider such a restructuring and try to avoid bankruptcy.21 In general, restructuring
would dominate bankruptcy.
Suppose next that the creditors can also buy CDS protection against the rm's credit
events. Clearly, bankruptcy would always be dened as a credit event. However, restructuring
may or may not be dened as a credit event, as per the clauses of the CDS contract. If
restructuring is included as a credit event, we dene the contract to be a Full Restructuring
(FR) CDS. If it is not, we dened it as a No Restructuring (NR) CDS.22
We rst consider the case of FR CDS. Assume that the CDS premium (price) is F in
present value terms at the time of default. Suppose the creditors buy CDS against Y of
face value of the CDS. Therefore, if the rm defaults, the creditors' total payo with CDS
protection is [rX+(1 r F )Y ], in the event of bankruptcy, and [RX+(1 R F )Y ]
if the debt is restructured. Again, the creditors are better o with bankruptcy than with
restructuring, if
[r X + (1  r   F ) Y ] > [RX + (1 R  F ) Y ];
i.e., when Y > X, since R > r. Hence, for FR CDS, bankruptcy dominates restructuring as
a choice for empty creditors for whom the amount of CDS purchased exceeds the bonds held.
Now consider the case of NR CDS. Assume that the CDS premium (price) in this case is
f in present value terms, where f < F . Suppose again that the creditors buy CDS against Y
21The precise size of R would be determined in a bargaining process between the creditors and the share-
holders of the rm.
22Other types of contracts also exist, but are not relevant for purposes of this simple illustration. See
Appendix C for details.
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of face value of the CDS. Therefore, if the rm defaults, the creditors' total payo with CDS
protection is [r X + (1  r   f) Y ], in the event of bankruptcy, and [R X   f  Y ] if
the debt is restructured. Bankruptcy is a preferred outcome for the creditors if
[r X + (1  r   f) Y ] > [RX   f  Y ];
or when
Y >
R  r
1  r X
.
which is true even when Y < X, since R < 1. Thus, for NR CDS, bankruptcy is preferred
when even a relatively small amount of CDS are purchased; hence, bankruptcy is the preferred
alternative for a larger range of holdings of CDS by the creditors.
It is also easy to see that buying CDS protection, with NR CDS contracts is a better
choice in bankruptcy than restructuring without CDS protection, so long as either
[r X + (1  r   f) Y ] > RX
which is equivalent to saying that:23
Y >
R  r
1  r   f X
This condition is met when Y > X as long as R < 1   f which is almost always true as
the cost of CDS protection should not be higher than the loss in the event of restructuring.
As before, it is likely to be true, even if Y<X, for reasonable values of R and f. Further,
the greater the dierence between Y and X, the greater the incentive to push the rm into
bankruptcy. Hence, our example shows that a) creditors have an incentive to over-insure
and push the rm into bankruptcy, b) this incentive increases with the dierence between Y
and X, i.e., the amount of CDS contracts outstanding relative to the rm's debt, and c) the
probability of bankruptcy occurring is greater for NR CDS contracts. This analysis provides
the intuition for our rst three hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 (Baseline) The credit risk of a rm and, in particular, its risk of bankruptcy
23The calculation for the FR CDS is the same, except that the fee is replaced by F instead of f . The precise
range of values for Y relative to X would be smaller than for the NR CDS, as argued above.
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increases after the introduction of trading on CDS contracts referenced to its default.
The rst hypothesis highlights the incentives driving creditors to prefer bankruptcy to
restructuring, due to the payos they receive from their holding of CDS.
Hypothesis 2 (Empty Creditor: CDS Trading) The increase in the bankruptcy risk of
a rm after the introduction of trading in CDS contracts referencing it is larger for rms with
more CDS contracts relative to debt outstanding (\over-insurance").
The second hypothesis explicitly refers to the relative benet from the purchase of CDS
contracts. The larger the holding of CDS relative to debt outstanding, the greater the benet
to the empty creditors, and hence, the incentive to tilt the rm towards bankruptcy.
Hypothesis 3 (Empty Creditor: No Restructuring) The increase in the bankruptcy risk
of a rm after the introduction of trading in CDS contracts referencing it is larger for No Re-
structuring (NR) contracts than for Full Restructuring (FR) contracts.
The third hypothesis suggests an even stronger test of the empty creditor channel by
using a special feature of the CDS contracts. If CDS contracts cover restructuring as a credit
event, then creditors will be compensated, whether the distress rm restructures or declares
bankruptcy. However, if restructuring is not protected, then the default event is triggered and
the empty creditor will only get compensated when the rm les for bankruptcy. Therefore,
we hypothesize that the empty creditor channel is even more eective for NR CDS.
Besides the empty creditor problem, another channel for CDS trading to aect bankruptcy
is through greater heterogeneity in creditor composition: coordination is more dicult when
there are more creditors. These coordination problems may be exacerbated due to potential
gaming activity by dierent groups of creditors.24
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show that more investment projects can be nanced when
CDS are traded on a rm, due to the possibility of risk mitigation using CDS for the lenders,
and hence, their increased willingness to lend to the rm. Thus, more banks are more willing
to lend to the rm if CDS are traded and an increased number of lenders after CDS trading
is consistent with the empty creditor model. Therefore, we hypothesize that the number of
lenders increases after CDS trading:
24This coordination problem has been linked with an accentuation of the bankruptcy risk by Gilson, John,
and Lang (1990). Brunner and Krahnen (2008) show that distress workouts are less successful when there are
more creditors.
14
Hypothesis 4 (Number of Lenders) The number of (bank) lenders increases after the in-
troduction of CDS trading.
There are other mechanisms for the exacerbation of credit risk, following the introduction
of CDS trading, that go beyond our illustrative example. More lenders are willing to partici-
pate after the introduction of CDS contracts, as their downside risk can be better managed
and used to earn a spread; if the loan performs well, the lending generates prots, if, on the
other hand, the loan quality deteriorates, the lender is protected by the CDS. Workouts are
less likely to be successful as more lenders see themselves as non-pivotal. Moreover, the CDS
market creates a venue for \insider trading" on credit information, as shown by Acharya and
Johnson (2007). Ultimately the net cost of insider trading is born by the borrower. (Lenders
may also bear a cost, but they will be repaid from the insider trading prots they generate.)
As the information asymmetry is likely to be priced in CDS spreads, this would be fed back to
the cost of debt, leading to greater bankruptcy risk. Thus, the overall eect of CDS trading
on rms will be increased leverage and higher cost of debt, leading to higher bankruptcy risk.
As discussed earlier, there are other indirect channels for CDS trading to aect bankruptcy
risk, such as increased debt capacity resulting from better risk sharing, reduced monitoring,
and feedback to rm borrowing costs. Such indirect channels generally go through the eects
on rm fundamentals, as rms become riskier. However, in our analysis, we control for rm
fundamentals, and hence, the indirect channels are not likely to drive our ndings on the
direct channels.
IV. Data and Empirical Methods
A. CDS Trading and Bankruptcy Data
We use actual transaction records to identify rms with CDS contracts written on them, and
in particular, the date when CDS trading began for each rm. Unlike voluntary dealer quotes
which are non-binding and may be based on hypothetical contract specications, transaction
data contain multi-dimensional information regarding the actual CDS contracts, including
price, volume and contact terms. Our CDS transaction data are derived from two separate
sources: CreditTrade and GFI Group. CreditTrade was the biggest data source for CDS
transactions during the initial phase of the CDS market before GFI Group took over as the
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market leader.25 (GFI ranked rst in the Risk Magazine ranking from 2002-2009). Combin-
ing data from these two sources allows us to assemble a comprehensive record of virtually
the entire history of North American corporate CDS trading activities. To ensure greater
accuracy, we also cross-checked this list of CDS introductions with the Markit CDS database,
a commonly used CDS dealer quote database, and conrmed our identication of the rms
with CDS traded.26
The CreditTrade data cover the period from June 1997 to March 2006. GFI data cover
the period from January 2002 to April 2009. Both datasets contain complete information on
intra-day quotes and trades such as the time of the transaction, order type, and the CDS
price. In our empirical analysis, we focus on CDS contracts written on non-sovereign North
American corporate issuers. Since CDS contracts are traded over-the-counter, unlike stocks
or equity options, which are mostly listed on exchanges, the rst trading date for each rm's
CDS is hard to pinpoint with a time stamp. However, because we have overlapping samples
from these two data sources between January 2002 and March 2006, we are able to cross-check
the two records to conrm the reliability of our identication of the rst CDS trading date.
In the event, the dates of rst appearance of a particular CDS in the two data sources are
mostly within a couple of months of each other. It should be stressed that any remaining
noise in identifying the precise date of introduction of a particular CDS should bias us against
nding signicant empirical results regarding the consequent eects on credit risk.
There are two important advantages of using transaction data in our empirical analysis.
First, our sample starts in 1997, which is regarded by many market observers as the inception
of the CDS market.27 Therefore, our identied rst CDS trading dates will not be contami-
nated by censoring of the data series. Second, our CDS transaction data have the complete
contractual terms such as the specication of the credit event, maturity, and delivery terms,
at the contract level. Aggregate position or quote data obtained from broker-dealers or, more
recently, clearing houses or data aggregators, would generally not have such information. The
credit event specication allows us to investigate the eect of restructuring clauses, as we do
in this paper. The maturity information at the contract level also allows us to calculate the
open CDS positions outstanding at each point in time.
Based on our merged data set, there are 901 North American rms that have CDS initiated
25Many other papers have used the same data sources. For example, Acharya and Johnson (2007) and
Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh (2005) utilize CreditTrade data in their analyses. CreditTrade was acquired by
Creditex in 2007 and Creditex merged with the CME in 2008. The analysis in Nashikkar, Subrahmanyam,
and Mahanti (2011) is also partly based on CDS data from the GFI Group.
26Markit provides end-of-day \average" indicative quotes from contributing dealers, using a proprietary
algorithm. In contrast, both CreditTrade and GFI report trades as well as binding quotes.
27See Tett (2009), for example.
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on them at some point during the 1997-2009 sample period. In the initial part of our analysis,
we mainly utilize the information about the rst day of CDS trading and compare the changes
in rm default risk upon the onset of CDS trading. Later on, to distinguish between the
alternative channels through which CDS trading aects credit risk, we also construct measures
of CDS attributes, based on the more detailed transaction information that we assemble.
We assemble a comprehensive bankruptcy data set by combining data from various sources
for North American corporations ling bankruptcies in U.S. courts. Our initial bankruptcy
sample is derived from New Generation Research's Public and Major Company Database.28
This database includes all public companies ling for bankruptcy and also signicant bankrupt-
cies of private rms. We further augment this preliminary sample with additional bankruptcy
ling data sources including the Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, the Fixed In-
come Securities Database (FISD), the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD),
and Moody's Annual Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery.29 Unlike other studies on bankruptcy,
we do not drop bankruptcies of small rms.
We link the bankruptcy data set with our CDS sample to identify CDS rms ling for
bankruptcy protection sometime after the rst day of their CDS trading. Table I presents the
year-wise summary from 1997 to 2009 for all rms in the Compustat database: the number
of bankrupt rms, the number of rms on which CDS are traded, and bankrupt rms with
and without CDS. As the table shows, there are 1,628 bankruptcy events during this sample
period. The bankruptcy lings in our sample are mostly concentrated in the time periods of
1999-2003 and 2008-2009, which account for 1,214 of the 1,628 bankruptcy events during the
entire sample period (74.6%). The fourth and fth columns of the table report the number
of New CDS and number of Acive CDS trading rms across the years, respectively. The
introduction of CDS is most pronounced from 2000 to 2003. Among the 901 distinct CDS
trading rms, 60 subsequently led for bankruptcy protection. The number of bankruptcies
among CDS rms is a small fraction of the total number of bankruptcies, since only relatively
large rms, by asset size and debt outstanding, are selected for CDS trading.
We obtain additional rm level data for our empirical analysis. Firm accounting and
nancial data are from CRSP and Compustat; credit rating data are from Compustat and
FISD; bond issuance data are from FISD; and, lending relationship data are from DealScan.30
Our bond trading data are from the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE)
maintained by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) over the period from
28The data are available at the website Bankruptcydata.com
29Our combined bankruptcy sample contains 2,345 bankruptcy lings from rms reporting data to Com-
pustat between 1978 and 2010.
30We thank Michael Roberts for providing the DealScan-Compustat linking le.
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2002-2009. In addition, we obtain analyst coverage data from I/B/E/S.
B. Empirical Methodology
The main objective of our analysis is to assess the impact of CDS inception on a rm's
bankruptcy risk. We employ three approaches in our analysis. The rst is based on uni-
variate dierence-in-dierence analysis. For each rm with CDS traded on it, we identify a
corresponding rm with similar characteristics, based on a matched propensity score, that
does not have CDS traded. The criterion for the propensity score matching is that rms in
the matched sample do not have CDS traded on them, but have a similar probability of CDS
trading to those with which they are matched. In our analysis, we focus on rms around the
date when CDS were rst traded on them (year t) to measure changes in credit risk from the
year t  1 through the end of year t+ 1, or year t+ 2.31
Our second approach is a proportional hazard model for bankruptcy using our panel data.
Following Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Bharath and Shumway (2008), we
assume that the marginal probability of bankruptcy over the next period follows a logistic
distribution with parameters (; ) and time varying covariates Xit 1:
Pr(Yit = 1jXit 1) = 1
1 + exp(   0Xit 1) ; (1)
where Yit is an indicator variable that equals one, if rm i les for bankruptcy in period t, and
Xit 1 is a vector of explanatory variables observed at the end of previous period. A higher
level of  + 0Xit 1 represents a higher probability of bankruptcy. We follow Bharath and
Shumway (2008), and estimate the model with ve fundamental determinants of default risk
in Xit 1, including the log of the rm's equity value (ln(E)), its return over the past year
(rit 1  rmt 1), the log of rm's debt (ln(F)), the inverse of the rm's equity volatility (1=E)
and the rm's ratio of net income to total assets (NI/TA).32
We include two CDS variables in the hazard model specications to estimate the impact
of CDS trading on bankruptcy risk, similar to Ashcraft and Santos (2009) and Saretto and
Tookes (2011). CDS Firm is a dummy variable that equals one for rms with CDS trading
at any point during our sample period. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one
after the rm started CDS trading. Therefore, for a rm with CDS traded on it, CDS Firm
always equals one, and is used to control for unobservable dierences between rms with and
31We also examine other windows in our analysis, as a robustness check.
32Longsta, Giesecke, Schaefer, and Strebulaev (2011) nd that the variables suggested by such structural
models outperform others in bankruptcy prediction.
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without CDS. CDS Active, however, equals zero before the CDS introduction and one after
the CDS introduction. Hence, the coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures
the marginal impact of CDS introduction on bankruptcy risk. The analysis is conducted in a
sample of rms that includes those with CDS traded on them and those without.33
Since ling for bankruptcy is relatively uncommon for rms, we also examine other indi-
cators of changes in credit risk that occur more frequently. One such signal is a change in the
credit rating of the rm, in particular a downgrade that signals deterioration in credit quality.
A downgrade in credit rating is a signal of deteriorating credit quality and may be a rst step
towards bankruptcy. In that spirit, we use credit rating downgrades as the dependent variable
in the hazard model, as an alternative specication. Since the sample size for downgrades
includes many more observations, we get a more powerful test of how CDS trading aects
rm credit quality.
Our third and main approach takes into account the endogeneity eect in the selection
of rms for CDS trading. It is possible that investors anticipate the deterioration in a rm's
credit quality and initiate CDS trading, where there is such potential, but there is a dierence
of opinion among market participants as to its likelihood. If this were the case, the observed
impact of CDS trading on credit risk would not be caused by the inception of CDS trading
per se, but the realization of investor expectations.
In case of an endogeneity problem, the estimation of the treatment eect (i.e., the eect
of CDS trading) may suer from errors due to a selection bias (sample-selection bias or self-
selection bias). Sample-selection bias originates from the availability of observable data; for
example, we observe CDS data only when there are actual trades that are reported in the
databases. On the other hand, self-selection or endogeneity bias refers to the possibility
that some of the predictors in the estimation equations may actually be choice variables.
In our empirical estimation, if the CDS Active variable is used as a primary predictor of
bankruptcy risk, and the non-random nature of the CDS Active is ignored, biased estimates
of the coecient of CDS Active may result. Both propensity score matching and the Heckman
two-stage approach could be used to partially correct for this selection bias.
With propensity score matching, we rst create a control group of rms that do not have
CDS traded on them, which can be compared with the treatment group of rms with CDS
traded. The control group is constructed based on observed predictors, obtained from a probit
regression to create a reference group. The model is then estimated with the two groups of
rms to determine whether the CDS Active variable has predictive power in the equation for
33We also analyze the coecient of the CDS Active variable in an alternative specication with rm xed
eects.
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the probability of credit downgrades or bankruptcy.
In the Heckman two-stage approach (or the Heckman correction), the sample selection
problem is regarded as an omitted variable bias. There might be an unobserved variable that
aects both the response variable (e.g., the probability of bankruptcy) and the individuals'
choice for the treatment group (e.g., the introduction of CDS trading) for the sample rms.
If the variable was observable, the problem can be solved by adding it as a covariate in the
response equation. However, since it is not observable, the Heckman correction approach
solves the problem by constructing a proxy variable (i.e., the Inverse Mills Ratio) for the
unobservable variable. In the rst step, a selection model is estimated via probit or logit
regressions. Then, the Inverse Mills Ratio can be calculated based on the residuals (i.e.,
the unobservable variables) of the selection model. In the second step, the original response
equation is estimated with the Inverse Mills Ratio as an additional explanatory variable.
Conditional on the original independent variables and the additional Inverse Mills Ratio, the
sample can be viewed as being randomly selected.34
The self-selection model of CDS trading that we use is based on Ashcraft and Santos
(2009):
Pr(CDSActive = 1) = f(Zit 1); (2)
where Z includes a set of explanatory variables for CDS trading such as volatility, rm size,
leverage, protability, credit rating status, and so on. From the previous probit regression,
we can calculate the propensity scores at each date, for each rm, for CDS trading, and use
them to nd matching rms. We can then estimate the probability of credit downgrades or
bankruptcy after controlling for possible selection bias. Alternatively, we could use the above
model to run a two-stage Heckman correction analysis.
In addition to CDS Active as our key indicator variable, we also investigate the channel
through which the impact of CDS trading manifests itself by constructing measures of both
CDS contracts outstanding, as well as the nature of the CDS contract itself. To measure
the extent of the empty creditor problem, we calculate the ratio of logarithm of the total
active CDS outstanding for the rm during month t scaled by the total debt outstanding at
the end of the month (Active CDS Outstanding/Debt). We conjecture that rms with larger
proportions of CDS to debt outstanding are more likely to be aected by the empty credi-
34It should be emphasized, however, that the Heckman correction approach relies on the strong distributional
assumptions about the error terms - that is the error terms from the rst step selection equation and from
the second step response equation are jointly normally distributed. This limitation partially explains the
continued popularity of the propensity score matching approach.
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tor problem, and hence, potentially have higher bankruptcy risk. Moreover, we distinguish
between dierent types of CDS contracts by their credit event specications. CDS contracts
with a \No Restructuring" credit event clause would be most susceptible to the empty cred-
itor concern, since they would not pay o in restructuring events. A detailed discussion on
the denition of credit events in the dierent types of CDS contracts is provided in Appendix
C.
V. CDS Trading and Credit Risk: Empirical Results
This section presents our empirical ndings on how the introduction of CDS trading on a
rm aects its bankruptcy risk. We rst report our baseline results regarding the eects on
credit ratings as well as bankruptcy. We then show that the results are robust to controlling
for the endogeneity of CDS trading, whereby rms may be selected for such trading due to
the potential deterioration in their credit quality.
A. Rating Changes Before and After CDS Introduction
Since bankruptcy is often an absorbing state, many bankrupt rms disappear from public
databases. Hence, we cannot conduct event studies on the eect of CDS introduction on
bankruptcy, as bankruptcy is a one-time event. Therefore, we choose to rst analyze credit
ratings, which are observable both before and after CDS introductions. As already noted, a
credit downgrade is often the rst step towards bankruptcy. Hence, the analysis of changes
in credit rating is likely to shed light on the likelihood of bankruptcy as well. Furthermore,
the number of credit downgrades in our sample vastly exceeds the number of bankruptcies.
We compare the distribution of credit ratings in the year before CDS trading to the rating
distribution within two years after CDS trading for rms with such contracts traded at some
point of time in our sample. The distributions are reported in Figure 1. Our rst observation
from Figure 1 is that A and BBB ratings are the most common issuer ratings when CDS
trading is initiated. The vast majority of rms in our sample (92%) are rated by a credit
rating agency at the onset of CDS trading - only a small proportion of rms are unrated.
Figure 1 shows a discernible shift to lower credit quality after the introduction of CDS
trading. While the proportion of BBB-rated rms is about the same before and after CDS
trading, the proportion of investment grade rms decreases. At the same time, the proportion
of non-investment grade and unrated rms increases (the increase in non-rated rms is likely
to be partly due to their withdrawals from the rating process). The results provide some
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preliminary evidence that following the inception of CDS trading on a rm, its credit qual-
ity deteriorates: the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic on distributional dierences, which
is signicant at the 1% level, shows that the credit rating distribution shifts to the right
(deteriorates) after CDS trading.
B. CDS Trading and Credit Risk: Baseline Hazard Model Results (H1)
After the preliminary analysis showing credit quality deterioration in a simple comparison
of ratings, we run multivariate tests to discern more systematic evidence on the eect of
inception of CDS trading, with appropriate control variables. We include both rms with
and without CDS traded in a panel data analysis, to study whether the introduction of CDS
trading increases credit risk. In our baseline analysis, we use both credit rating downgrades
and bankruptcy ling to measure bankruptcy risk.
We follow Bharath and Shumway (2008) and estimate the logistic model of credit rating
downgrade or bankruptcy outlined in Section IV.B.35 Our main CDS variables are: CDS
Firm which equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise, CDS Active
which equals one if the rm has CDS trading one year before the observation month. The
coecient of CDS Firm separates the dierential likelihood of deterioration in credit risk, by
a credit downgrade or eventually bankruptcy ling, for rms with CDS traded on them. The
coecient of CDS Active captures the impact of CDS trading on the probabilities of credit
rating downgrading or bankruptcy ling after the inception of CDS trading. The analysis is
conducted with monthly observations.
The proportional hazard model estimation results are presented in Table II. Panel A
shows results using all rms. The rst column lists the independent variables in the model
estimation. The second and third columns show the results for credit rating downgrades.
The fourth and fth columns show the results for bankruptcy prediction. The third and fth
columns include CDS Firm as a control to show that the eect of CDS Active is not driven
by fundamental dierences between CDS rms and non-CDS rms.
Credit ratings are more likely to be downgraded after CDS trading as evidenced by the
positive coecient estimate for CDS Active. In both the second and the third columns, the
eect of CDS trading is statistically signicant at the 1% level. The economic magnitude is
also large: Compared to the average downgrading probability of 0.58% in the third column,
the marginal eect of CDS trading on downgrading is 0.39%. The fth column of reports
35We also examined other specications (e.g., Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008)) and our conclusions
are not aected by the use of dierent control variables.
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similar ndings for bankruptcy ling. Firms are more likely to go bankrupt after CDS trading.
Against an average rm bankruptcy probability of 0.14%, the marginal eect of CDS trading
on bankruptcy probability is 0.33%. The odds ratio for CDS Active for credit downgrades
and bankruptcy predictions are 1.925 and 10.73 respectively.
The estimation results for the variable CDS Firm in the third and fth columns, which
are statistically signicant at the 1% level, for both downgrades and bankruptcy analysis, are
worth noting. Compared to non-CDS rms, CDS rms are more likely to be downgraded
but less likely to go bankrupt, which is consistent with our conjecture that CDS rms are
fundamentally dierent from non-CDS rms as a group. Moreover, we nd that CDS Active
is signicant, whether we include CDS Firm in the regressions or not.
The estimation results for the control variables are similar to the ndings in prior studies.
Larger rms and rms with higher stock returns are less likely to be downgraded or to go
bankrupt. Firms with more debt and more volatile rms are more likely to be downgraded
or to go bankrupt. Protable rms are, obviously, less likely to le for bankruptcy.
Since our main focus here is on credit risk, and, in particular, the probability of bankruptcy,
an alternative approach in isolating the CDS trading eect is to match rms based on their
initial credit quality, rather than using all non-CDS rms as control group. We use distance-
to-default (DD) as a credit risk control to identify matching rms for our CDS rms. DD
is calculated from the Merton (1974) model and modied by Bharath and Shumway (2008)
as described in Appendix B. It is a measure of the dierence between the asset value of the
rm and the face value of its debt, scaled by the standard deviation of rm's asset value.
By matching on DD, the CDS and non-CDS matched rms have a similar probability of
bankruptcy, at the inception of CDS trading. Then, the hazard model analysis of the impact
of CDS trading on the probability of bankruptcy is conducted in the sample of CDS rms
and their corresponding non-CDS DD matched rms.
The estimation results for the DD-matched sample are reported in Table II Panel B. The
analysis is the same as in Panel A except with a smaller, but more comparable sample (the
sample size for Panel B is about one-fth of Panel A). All columns show that CDS Active has
a positive and signicant eect on credit risk. For example, the fth column shows that the
marginal eect of CDS trading on probability of bankruptcy is 0.12% relative to the sample
default rate of 0.05%. Compared to Panel A, we nd that, as expected, the eect of the
control variable CDS Firm appears to be less signicant for bankruptcy prediction, since the
rms have already been matched based on DD.
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C. The Selection of Firms for CDS Trading
The main challenge to inferring a causal relationship from our baseline results in the previous
sub-section that CDS trading is positively related to deterioration in credit quality is the
potential endogeneity of CDS trading. It is conceivable that investors anticipate the dete-
rioration in a rm's credit quality and initiate CDS trading on it. Thus, there could be a
selection bias for rms on which CDS trading is initiated, in that they are inherently more
likely to decline in credit quality. In this section, we attempt to endogenize CDS trading and
factor this endogeneity into our bankruptcy risk analysis. Our CDS trading selection model
is generalized from Ashcraft and Santos (2009), as discussed in Section IV.B. 36 Our objective
is to use the best model to explain the presence of CDS trading on rms, and then estimate
the probabilities of credit deterioration, after adjusting for such potential selection bias.
The endogeneous variable is CDS Active. (CDS Firm is used to measure rm fundamentals
and assumed to be exogenous.) The market for CDS is driven by the supply and demand for
credit risk transfer. The concern for bankruptcy is more pronounced for rms with inherently
higher credit risk. Therefore, we include credit risk variables such as protability, equity
volatility, leverage, and distance-to-default (DD), and whether the rm is rated, into the
model for predicting the inception of CDS trading. In addition, we also include a set of
rm characteristics such as rm size, revenues, working capital, cash holdings and capital
expenditure. Lastly, we also include the reference rm's bond trading turnover which measures
potential demand for hedging with CDS contracts.
We start with rms with CDS traded on them, but keep data for rm-months from 1997
until the rst month of inception of CDS trading. Then, we add all non-CDS rms. Thus, the
probit model analysis of the probability of CDS trading is conducted in a sample including
both rms with CDS traded and all non-CDS rms. The dependent variable is equal to
one after the rm starts CDS trading, and it equals zero before CDS trading. The probit
regression results are reported in Table III. They show that CDS trading is more likely for
larger rms, rms with credit ratings, and rms with higher leverage. However, CDS trading
is less likely for rms with higher equity volatility and DD. CDS trading is also more likely
for rms with higher prot margin and cash holding. As expected, rms with higher bond
trading turnover are more likely to have CDS trading. The pseudo-R2 of the prediction model
is 37.12%.
In the following analysis, we will use this CDS trading prediction model to select matching
rms and re-examine the relationship between CDS trading and bankruptcy risk. Our rst
36A similar approach is used by Saretto and Tookes (2011).
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approach relies on propensity score matching. Based on the estimated model parameters,
propensity scores can be calculated for each rm. For each CDS rm, the matched non-CDS
trading rm is selected as the one with closest match in propensity score.
D. Dierence-in-Dierence Analysis
We compare the changes in rm characteristics relevant to credit quality before and after
CDS introduction, relative to matching rms with similar propensity scores for CDS trading.
In the sample of CDS and non-CDS propensity score matched rms, we rst conduct a
univariate dierence-in-dierence analysis of the change in rm credit quality around the
date of introduction of CDS trading. The treatment we examine here is the introduction of
CDS trading on a rm, which captures an increase in the availability of credit risk transfer
instruments to suppliers of capital. The dierence-in-dierence results are reported in Table
IV. The left panel shows the changes from year t  1 to year t+1. The right panel shows the
changes from year t  1 to year t+ 2.37
The results show that the credit quality of rms deteriorates signicantly after the intro-
duction of CDS trading, compared to their matched rms. The popular default probability
measure, expected default frequency (EDF), which is a transformation of DD, increases by
0.4% more than matched rms from year t  1 to year t+ 1, and by 4.2% from year t  1 to
year t+2, with greater statistical signicance. The Z -score decreases after CDS introduction
as well, although this is only marginally signicant. Credit ratings are marginally lower for
year t + 1 compared to year t   1, although the changes are not statistically signicant in
all cases. In addition, rm leverage signicantly increases by 0.016 from year t   1 to year
t+ 1, and by 0.023 from year t  1 to t+ 2, around the introduction of CDS trading. These
indicators suggest that the credit condition of rms is negatively aected by CDS trading.
This nding, as well as the magnitude of leverage change, is consistent with the conclusions
of Saretto and Tookes (2011).
The advantage of the dierence-in-dierence analysis is that it controls for rm character-
istics before CDS trading, relative to rms matched by CDS trading propensity score. The
ndings from the dierence-in-dierence analysis suggest that the credit quality of CDS rms
drops signicantly after CDS introduction. Such a comparison is akin to a \short-window"
event analysis. However, the univariate dierence-in-dierence analysis of the change in rm
performance may raise concerns of omitted variables. We address these concerns in the fol-
lowing section, where we use hazard models in a \long-window" analysis with controls for
37We also examined other neighboring windows and nd similar results. However, the eects are muted
beyond year t+ 3.
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matching rms.
E. CDS Trading and Bankruptcy Risk: Propensity Score Matching
Table V presents the results from re-estimation of the model used in Table II, with a restricted
sample. The full sample, including rms with CDS and without CDS traded on them, is used
for the analysis in Table II, Panel A. For Table V, we only include rms with CDS traded and
their propensity score-matched rms, dropping rms that either have no CDS traded or are
not chosen from the propensity score matching. Therefore, the rms in the restricted sample
are more comparable to each other, but the sample size is also much smaller in Table V. Since
DD is included in the CDS selection model, the analysis for Table V further improves upon
Panel B of Table II.
Table V shows that the positive relation between CDS trading and bankruptcy risk is still
signicant, when we use the propensity score matching to control for CDS trading endogeneity.
CDS rms are, on average, less likely to go bankrupt compared to non-CDS rms, which are
equally likely to have CDS trading. This could be due to the increased nancing channels
for CDS rms.38 The coecient for CDS Active continues to be positive and signicant in
both the downgrading and the bankruptcy specications. The economic magnitude is also
large, as seen in the second column: Compared to the average downgrading probability of
1.90%, the marginal eect of CDS trading on downgrading is 1.33%. The third column of
Table V reports similar ndings for bankruptcy. Firms are more likely to go bankrupt after
CDS trading. Against an average rm probability of bankruptcy in the universe of rms of
0.07%, the marginal eect of CDS trading is 0.13%. The odds ratios for CDS active for credit
downgrades and bankruptcy prediction are 2.051 and 6.456 respectively.
Propensity score matching is useful when there is no systematic bias in the calculation
of the propensity scores. However, it does suer from potential mis-specication of the haz-
ard model itself. To alleviate this potential deciency, we next use the two-stage Heckman
correction model as an alternative approach to take into account the endogeneity of CDS
trading.
38We note that, in Table II, rms with CDS traded are more likely to be downgraded. After controlling
for the endogeneity in CDS trading in Table V, rms with CDS traded on them are still more likely to be
downgraded compared to rms without CDS.
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F. CDS Trading and Bankruptcy Risk: Heckman Correction
The CDS sample selection issue can be viewed as a form of omitted-variables bias in the sense
of Heckman (1979). In the rst step, we model the probability of CDS trading using a probit
model similar to the model underlying Table III. Based on the estimated model parameters
from the rst stage, we calculate the Inverse Mills Ratio, which is a transformation of these
predicted individual probabilities of CDS trading. Then, in the second stage, the hazard
model analysis of the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy is conducted by including
the Inverse Mills ratio as an additional explanatory variable. Unlike the propensity score
matching approach with only matched rms, we include all rm observations in the second-
stage analysis.
The results are presented in Table VI. The eect of CDS Firm on downgrading is again
positive, but negative for bankruptcy ling. The coecient of the Inverse Mills Ratio is
insignicant for the bankruptcy regression, but signicantly negative for the downgrading
regression. Therefore, selection bias does not seem to aect the bankruptcy results, but may
inuence the inference of the downgrading results. More importantly, the coecients of CDS
Active are positive and signicant at the 1% level in both the downgrading and bankruptcy
analysis. The economic magnitude is also large as seen in the second column: Compared
to the average downgrading probability of 0.58%, the marginal eect of CDS trading on
downgrading is 0.80%. The third column of Table VI reports similar ndings for bankruptcy
lings. Firms are more likely to go bankrupt after CDS trading. Against an average sample
probability of bankruptcy is 0.14%, the marginal eect of CDS trading is 0.37%. The odds
ratios for CDS Active for credit downgrades and bankruptcy prediction are 4.187 and 14.585
respectively. These results shows that the positive relationship between CDS trading and
bankruptcy risk is robust to the selection of rms for CDS trading.
The propensity score matching method and the Heckman correction procedure each have
their respective merits (and demerits). However, in our case, both approaches yield consistent
results that suggest that the nding that bankruptcy risk increases with CDS trading is
robust.39
39We considered using two stage least squares (2SLS) for this estimation, to address the errors-in-variables
problem. Unfortunately, we face a technical challenge to implement this when the rst stage of the 2SLS is a
logit regression estimated with maximum likelihood instead of least squares.
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G. Imperfect Matching and Identication
One part of the endogeneity concern is that unobservable factors may drive the introduction
of CDS trading. It is possible that CDS introduction is based on private information that our
matching variables cannot pick up either directly or by proxy. In such a case, our matching
approach cannot eectively address the concern on CDS trading endogeneity. We hypothesize
that private information is more likely to be important when the information environment
is poor. Therefore, if our results are driven by imperfect matching, our ndings should be
stronger for rms with poor information quality.
We examine the issue of information quality by segmenting rms based on the extent of
their analyst coverage, high versus low, to examine if the eects of CDS trading dier between
the two groups. We then re-estimate our baseline hazard model for bankruptcy prediction
for the two sub-samples. (The downgrading results are not reported to preserve space.) The
results of these estimations are reported in Table VII. The second column presents results
for rms with low analyst coverage and third column presents results for rms with high
analyst coverage. These regressions show that the eect of CDS trading, as measured by the
coecient of the CDS Active variable, is positive and signicant for rms with high analyst
coverage, but only marginally signicant for rms with low analyst coverage, contrary to the
private information hypothesis. We check this further by running the estimation for the full
sample with a dummy variable for low analyst coverage, Low Coverage, including a cross
term for this variable with CDS Active. The last column reports the results, which show that
the CDS trading eects for the low analyst coverage rms are not statistically signicantly
dierent from rms with the high analyst coverage, as shown by the coecient estimate for
CDS Active * Low Coverage. These ndings suggest that private information is not driving
our nding. It is noteworthy that in the third and fourth columns, the coecients of the CDS
Active variable remain remarkably stable and statistically signicant. The marginal eect
of an increase in the CDS Active variable in the full sample regression on the probability of
bankruptcy is 0.32%, compared to the overall sample probability of 0.14%.
Our nding on analyst coverage has implications for the channel through which CDS
trading aects bankruptcy risk. Bank monitoring is arguably less critical for rms with high
analyst coverage, which essentially serves as public monitoring tool. Given that there is no
cross-sectional variation in the CDS eect with respect to analyst coverage, we can infer that
the CDS eect is not fully driven by its impact on bank monitoring. This evidence motivates
our focus on the empty creditor channel in the next section.
In additional analysis to check for the robustness of our results (not presented here, to
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conserve space), we nd that if we shift the CDS introduction by one year, the eect of
CDS Active is insignicant. This nding is consistent with the correct identication of tim-
ing of CDS introduction, as well as the the eect of CDS trading. These results indirectly
suggest that our ndings are not aected by private information, which may be driving the
introduction of new CDS contracts.
H. CDS Trading or Downgrading? Controlling for the Credit Rating Eect
We examine the eect of CDS trading on bankruptcy risk relative to the direct eect of rating
downgrading itself.40 A rating downgrade is a potential omitted variable for the bankruptcy
analysis, as we nd that the introduction of CDS trading directly aects credit rating. There-
fore, we investigate bankruptcy risk changes while controlling for changes in the credit rating
status. We conduct a logistic regression of bankruptcy lings in two dierent ways using
our propensity score matched sample. The results are reported in Table VIII. We retain the
baseline results in the second column, titled Model 1, for comparison.
The dependent variable is the probability of bankruptcy. In Model 2, reported in the
third column, we use a dummy variable Unrated which equals one if the rm is unrated in
the observation month. We also include the cross term between CDS Active and Unrated to
capture the interaction eect. We nd that the eect of CDS Active is robust to controlling
for rating status. Furthermore, the eect of CDS Active is stronger (although only marginally
signicant) for unrated rms, since such rms may be more likely to go bankrupt to begin with.
In the fourth column, Model 3, we add the explanatory variable Downgrade to control for the
direct inuence of a rating downgrade. Downgrade is a dummy variable that equals one if there
was a credit downgrade for the rm, one year before the current month. This specication
contrasts the predictive power of CDS trading with credit rating downgrading in predicting
bankruptcy risk. Against an average sample probability of bankruptcy is 0.07%, the marginal
eects of CDS trading are 0.12% and 0.11% in Model 2 and Model 3 respectively. The odds
ratio for CDS Active for the Models 2 and 3 are 5.635 and 6.773 respectively. The results show
that rms are more likely to go bankrupt if they were unrated, or were downgraded, just prior
to the introduction of CDS trading. More importantly, CDS trading signicantly increases
the rm's probability of bankruptcy, even after controlling for the inuence of downgrading.
Given that rating agencies make downgrade decisions based on their own judgements, the
impact of CDS trading on rating downgrading and bankruptcy may be driven by dierent
mechanisms. The nding that the CDS trading eect is consistent, but beyond the eect of
40In our regression sample, there are 73 downgrades within one year before CDS introduction.
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rating downgrading, suggests that rating agencies may overlook the direct inuence of CDS
trading on bankruptcy risk when conducting credit analysis.
VI. The Mechanisms: \Empty Creditor",
Restructuring, and Lender Composition
In the previous section, we presented consistent, robust evidence that CDS trading increases
corporate credit risk. As argued in the introduction, the primary mechanism through which
this occurs is through the creation of empty creditors of the rm (who hedge their credit risk
partially, completely or even more than completely). This mechanism manifests itself through
two dierent channels (restructuring and monitoring): The rst channel through which the
empty creditor mechanism works is by creating dierent incentives regarding restructuring
of the rm's liabilities for empty creditors compared with other creditors - empty creditors
are less willing to restructure the rm's debt; this, in turn, increases the probability of a
credit downgrade and bankruptcy.41 The second channel arises because empty creditors have
reduced incentives to monitor the borrower, since they gain little from such activity. Conse-
quently, if some creditors reduce their monitoring, borrowers may take on riskier projects, thus
exacerbating the rm's bankruptcy risk.42 Moreover, the selection of of a rm for CDS trading
may be contingent on monitoring costs, as suggested by Beyhaghi and Massoud (2011).
This section explores the restructuring channel in greater depth. We present direct evi-
dence for the restructuring channel of the empty creditor mechanism. Moreover, we analyze
how CDS trading may aect the lender composition, which may induce coordination failures
during distress workouts.
41The Trust Indenture Act of 1939 prohibits public debt restructuring without unanimous consent. Hence,
public debt restructuring usually takes the form of exchange oers. As a consequence, there could be a
potential holdout problem, since some bondholders may not participate in the oer. In this context, James
(1996) shows that bank debt forgiveness is important for the success of public debt exchange oers.
42An alternative channel through which CDS trading aects the credit risk of the rm is through mispricing
of the CDS. If CDS spreads are pushed up due to an external shock, in relation to the corresponding bond yield
spreads, this may feed back to the rm's bond market through arbitrage between the two markets, making it
more costly and dicult for the rm to renance its obligations. This causes the operating environment to
worsen, leading to a worsening of the rm's credit quality. On the other hand, high CDS spreads also increase
the cost of buying CDS protection, and hence, reduce the incentive of creditors to become empty creditors. If
CDS spreads are underpriced or too low, then informed traders have a greater incentive to buy CDS contracts
and expect to make prots from the subsequent increase in CDS spreads.
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A. Testing the Empty Creditor Hypothesis: Outstanding CDS Positions
(H2)
The unique aspect of the restructuring channel of the empty creditor mechanism is the preva-
lence of over-insurance with CDS contracts by lenders. The monitoring channel will not have
such an implication, as the minimum level of monitoring is no monitoring at all (lenders can-
not \negatively" monitor). Hence, over-insurance should have little or no incremental eect
for the monitoring channel. In contrast, this over-insurance is directly linked to the lenders'
incentive to force borrowers into bankruptcy by rejecting restructuring (the channel through
which the empty creditor mechanism works), and consequently, receiving payments from CDS
sellers. The greater the degree of over-insurance by the empty creditor, the larger her benet
from rejecting restructuring.
Unfortunately, we do not have data on individual investors' CDS positions. The only
indirect proxy we can observe is CDS trading volume which provides a measure of outstanding
CDS contracts in our sample. We measure the severity of the empty creditor problem - the
level of over-insurance - by the ratio of total CDS contracts outstanding during month t scaled
by total debt outstanding at the same time (Active CDS Outstanding/Debt). We conjecture
that rms with greater relative proportions of CDS outstanding are more exposed to the
empty creditor problem, and consequently, will have higher bankruptcy risk.
Table IX reports our estimation results. This table re-estimates the baseline hazard model,
where instead of using the indictor variable for CDS Active, we use a continuous measure for
CDS exposure. CDS Active is a regime variable, since once a rm starts CDS trading, it
cannot go back to be a non-CDS rm. However, the continuous measure of CDS exposure,
(Active CDS Outstanding/Debt) is not static or permanent. The continuous measure of CDS
exposure goes up/down, as and when CDS contracts are created/matured. Therefore, this
continuous measure is not as aected by the selection issue analyzed at length in Section V
of the paper. The average CDS exposure relative to total debt is 0.10 and median is 0.02.
The maximum exposure in our sample is 4.14, strongly suggestive of over-insurance for such
rms.
Table IX shows a signicant positive coecient of Active CDS Outstanding/Debt. The
marginal eect of an increase in this variable on the probability of bankruptcy is 0.01%,
compared to the overall sample probability of 0.14%. This nding is direct evidence supporting
the prediction of the empty creditor model. That is, a larger amount of CDS contracts
outstanding relative to rm's debt outstanding is associated with a higher probability of rm
bankruptcy.
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While it is comforting to nd that outstanding amount of CDS contracts also aects
bankruptcy risk, comparing the results in Table IX and results in Section V suggests that a
better specication is to treat CDS Active as a regime variable. (We do not include both CDS
Active and Active CDS Outstanding/Debt in the analysis of Table IX due to multi-collinearity
concern.) An explanation for this nding could be that the aggregate variable, Active CDS
Outstanding/Debt, capture the incentives of individual creditors, who may be \overinsured"
with noise. However, there seem to be fundamental changes in rms after the introduction
of CDS trading. The potential empty creditor problem is the main issue, but the concern
about accentuating this problem is perhaps of secondary importance: Once the creditors have
substantial stakes from CDS, their incentive to push the borrowers into bankruptcy will be
strong.
B. Testing the Empty Creditor Hypothesis: The Restructuring Clause in
CDS Contracts (H3)
Empty creditors would clearly prefer rms to declare bankruptcy rather than have the debt
restructured only if bankruptcy, but not restructuring, triggers a credit event for CDS con-
tracts and generates payments to CDS buyers. Empty creditors would not have this incentive
to the same degree if their CDS contracts also include restructuring as a credit event, as
argued in Section III. Thus, the strength of the restructuring channel of the empty creditor
problem depends crucially on the denition of the restructuring clause in the CDS contracts.
In this section, we investigate the eect of dierences in contractual terms on the credit risk
consequences of CDS trading. Appendix C provides a detailed discussion of the restructuring
clause in CDS contracts and its historical evolution. Essentially, there are four types of
CDS contracts, based on their denition of credit events: full restructuring (FR), modied
restructuring (MR), modied-modied restructuring (MMR), no restructuring (NR). For FR
contracts, any restructuring qualies as a trigger event, and any obligations with a maturity
up to 30 years can be delivered in the event that the event is triggered. Under MR also, any
restructuring is dened as credit event; however, the deliverable obligations are limited to
those with maturities within 30 months of the CDS contract's maturity. For MMR contracts,
the deliverable obligations are relaxed to include those with maturities within 60 months
of the CDS contract's maturity for restructured debt, and 30 months for other obligations.
Under NR, restructuring is excluded as credit event.
As argued in Section III, rms with more NR contracts are more subject to the empty
creditor threat than other types of CDS. FR contracts would not as strongly inuenced by the
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empty creditor incentives. Another related issue is the type of settlement. Earlier, most CDS
contracts were settled by physical delivery, while more recently, cash settlement is the norm.
Contracts settled by physical delivery, such as MR and MMR, should have an additional
inuence from the empty creditor problem. The actual CDS spreads in the market reect the
dierences in the contract structure, as shown by Packer and Zhu (2005).43
Figure 2 plots the number of contracts in each year with dierent contractual terms ob-
served in our CDS transactions records. The majority of rms in our sample have MR type
of clauses in their CDS contracts. The other two types (FR and MMR) are negligible in our
sample, which is quite representative of the market as whole. The gure shows that there is
hardly any NR CDS prior to year 2002. This is reasonable as the MR contracts were only just
slightly more expensive than NR contracts (as documented by Packer and Zhu (2005)); there-
fore, CDS buyers prefered to buy MR contracts. The proportion of CDS contracts with NR
specications increased considerably in recent years, especially in 2007. The median fraction
of NR contracts out of all CDS contracts for a reference entity is 0.61, and mean is 0.55. We
also nd that there is wide variation across rms in the proportion of NR type of contracts.
We account for the dierences in contractual specications in the revised estimations
reported in Table X, which include variables measuring the type of CDS contracts. No
Restructuring CDS is the fraction of CDS contracts with NR clauses. Modied Restructuring
CDS is the fraction of CDS with MR clauses. Since there are very few contracts with the
FR or MMR specication in our sample, we focus only on the MR and NR types. We run
separate regressions with the two CDS type dummy variables (reported in the second and
third columns), and also a combined one with both of them (reported in the last column). The
results in Table X show that indeed only for NR contracts do we nd a positive relationship
of CDS trading to bankruptcy risk, while the coecient of the MR dummy is not statistically
signicant. The marginal eect of an increase in the No Restucturing CDS variable in the
combined regression on the probability of bankruptcy is 0.22%, compared to the overall sample
probability of 0.14%.44
The results in this subsection strongly support the empty creditor model prediction. Com-
43However, the magnitude of this contractual eect appears to be modest. FR contracts command 7.7 bps
higher spreads, on average, compared with NR contracts. The MR-MMR spread dierence is only 1.4 bps. It
is unclear whether the latter dierence in contractual terms would have a material inuence on bankruptcy
prediction. It should be noted that these results use data from the earlier period of the CDS market and
may not reect the changes that occurred later on, especially after the global nancial crisis, and should be
interpreted with caution.
44We also segmented the sample by time, to test for the secular evolution of contract terms. We expect that
the restructuring concern should be less material in inuencing credit risk prior to 2000, when restructuring
was normally included as credit event in CDS contracts. In results not reported here, we nd that the CDS
trading eect is signicant only in more recent years.
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paring Table IX and Table X, we can see that Table X ts the data better. The eect of
CDS Active seems to be driven by those CDS contracts with NR clauses. Given that more
and more CDS contracts use NR as the credit event specication (e.g., all index constituents
of the CDX.NA.IG index), our ndings will likely to be applicable to many more reference
names in the future.
C. Testing the Implications of the Empty Creditor Hypothesis: Change in
Number of Lenders (H4)
Another unique, albeit implicit, prediction of the empty creditor theory is that rms will have
a more diversied lender base, following CDS trading. This is related to strategic actions by
creditors and a potential coordination failure, as discussed earlier. It is reasonable to expect
that the lead bank may not choose to become an empty creditor for short-run prots, due to
long-run reputation concerns. Therefore, CDS trading may aect the size and composition
of the loan syndicate to a rm. Indeed, from a univariate dierence-in-dierence analysis, we
nd that the number of bank relationships of a rm increases signicantly by 1.4, one year
after the inception of CDS trading, and by 3, two years after CDS trading.
We investigate the impact of CDS introduction on the creditor relationships of a rm. The
overall creditor relationship is represented in our analysis by the bank relationships available
from Dealscan LPC. For each rm in a given month, we examine the prior ve-year period
for any syndicated loan facilities for this rm. Summing over all such active facilities, we
compute the number of unique banks. MNumber of Banks is the change in the number of
bank relationships from one year before the inception of CDS trading to two years after the
inception of CDS trading. We regress the change in Number of Banks on a set of rm specic
variables and the CDS Active variable. The results are reported in Panel A of Table XI. We
nd that CDS trading signicantly increases the number of banking relationships a rm has.
On average, rms have 2.4 more lenders after CDS introduction controlling for other factors
which may aect the number of lenders such as rm size and leverage.
The relationship between the number of lenders and bankruptcy risk has been previously
documented. We present similar evidence for our sample, also including the eect of CDS
trading, in Panel B of Table XI. We include the Number of Banks as an additional explanatory
variable in the hazard model of the rm's probability of bankruptcy. The results indicate
that a rm's bankruptcy risk increases with the number of banking relationships, even after
controlling for direct impact of CDS trading. Therefore, the results in this table are consistent
with the prediction of the empty creditor model in Bolton and Oehmke (2011) i.e., CDS
34
trading increases the number of creditors as well as bankruptcy risk.
VII. Concluding Remarks
We show that CDS trading increases the bankruptcy risk of rms by analyzing a comprehen-
sive data set of North American CDS introductions over the period of 1997-2009. On average,
rms with CDS traded on them see a decline in their credit rating by half a notch, while their
probability of bankruptcy more than doubles from 0.14% to 0.33%. Our conclusion is robust
to controlling for the endogeneity in CDS trading, i.e., the possibility that rms that are
vulnerable to exacerbated credit risk are selected for CDS trading in the rst place. Our
results support the \empty creditor" hypothesis originally proposed by Hu and Black (2008)
and modeled by Bolton and Oehmke (2011). Lenders who insure themselves by buying CDS
protection help push borrowers into bankruptcy, even though restructuring may be a better
choice for the rm from the conventional (without CDS protection) lenders' perspective. This
is because the empty creditors are better o in default due to the payment from the CDS
being triggered following the bankruptcy event.
Our study is the rst empirical work, to our knowledge, to formally address the empty
creditor concern, which has attracted a lot of attention among academics, practitioners and
regulators. The robustness checks we employ range from alternative controls for the eects
of endogeneity, the quantum of CDS contracts outstanding and the denition of credit events
in the CDS contracts. Our main conclusion remains valid even after taking these factors into
account: Not only does trading in CDS on a rm increase the credit risk of the rm, but the
eects are accentuated by the size of the CDS contracts outstanding, and when the contracts
do not include restructuring as a credit event.
We hope that our study will improve our understanding of the implications of CDS trading
and contribute to the ongoing debate on this important market. We emphasize that although
we show that rms become more vulnerable to bankruptcy once CDS starts trading, our
study does not imply that CDS trading necessarily reduces social welfare. Indeed, as Bolton
and Oehmke (2011) argue, CDS may actually increase debt capacity, since many previously
unqualied projects may get funded due to the possibility of mitigation of credit risk aorded
by the CDS. Therefore, the increase in bankruptcy risk may result from an increased borrower
base, which increases the overall supply of credit in the economy. Future work may examine
the tradeo between the increased debt capacity and bankruptcy vulnerability caused by
CDS, shedding light on the impact of CDS trading on bankruptcy eciency.
35
Our study has implications for investors, corporate executives, and regulators. Investors
can incorporate the impact of CDS trading on the likelihood of bankruptcy in their pricing
of corporate debt, particularly when the risk is already high. Credit rating agencies ought
to take CDS trading into account in their rating decisions. Corporate executives as well
as investment bankers should factor in the CDS market into their decision making regarding
capital structure and leverage choices. Financial regulators and policy makers need to consider
the increase in credit risk following CDS trading into account in their regulatory actions. In
particular, banking regulators need to incorporate this eect in their risk weighting formulae,
while securities regulators may require further disclosures of CDS positions, so that investors
are made more aware of the extent of the empty creditor problem for individual rms.
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B The Merton Model and the Distance to Default
The Merton (1974) model provides a framework to measure the Distance-to-Default (Merton
DD), a measure of a rm's default probability at any given point in time. Under the Merton
framework, the rm is assumed to default when its asset value is less than the face value of
debt at the forecasting horizon. Based on Merton (1974), the model assumes that the rm's
asset value follows a geometric Brownian motion:
dV = V dt+ V V dW; (3)
where V is the asset value of the rm,  is the expected continuously compounded return on
asset, V is the asset value volatility and dW is a standard Wiener process. Then the equity
value of the rm is a call option on the rm's assets with a strike price equal to the face value
of the rm's debt:
E = V N(d1)  e rTFN(d2); (4)
d1 =
ln(V=F ) + (r + 0:52V )
p
T
V T
; d2 = d1   V
p
T (5)
where E is the market value of the rm's equity, F is the face value of debt, r is the risk-free
rate, N(:) is the cumulative standard normal distribution. By Ito's lemma, the volatilities of
the asset value and the equity are related by:
E = (
V
E
)N(d1)V (6)
Based on this framework, Merton DD utilizes equations above to estimate the unobservable
value and volatility of a rm's assets, i.e., V and V respectively, using the observed E and the
estimated E. Following an iterative procedure along the lines of Vassalou and Xing (2004)
and Bharath and Shumway (2008), the Merton DD can be calculated as
DD =
ln(V=F ) + (  0:52V )T
V
p
T
(7)
Hence, the Expected Default Frequency (EDF), or the implied default probability, is calcu-
lated as
EDF = N( ( ln(V=F ) + (  0:5
2
V )T
V
p
T
)) = N( DD): (8)
41
C Credit Default Swaps Credit Event Denitions
Credit default swaps (CDS) provide insurance protection against the default of a reference
entity's debt. For the buyer of protection to obtain payment from a CDS contract, a credit
event must be triggered. Following such an event, the CDS contract can be settled either by
physical delivery (by delivering the reference security and receiving the notional principal) or
payment of cash (by receiving the dierence between the notional principal and the price of
the reference security). The trade organization of participants in the derivatives market, the
International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) sets the standards for the contrac-
tual terms of CDS contracts, including the denition of the trigger events, the delivery and
settlement process and other details.
Based on the 1999 ISDA Credit Event Denitions, there are six categories of trigger events
for calling a default for dierent obligors: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation acceleration,
obligation default, repudiation/moratorium and restructuring. For CDS linked to corporate
debt, the primary trigger events are bankruptcy, failure to pay and restructuring. Under this
denition, known as full restructuring (FR) any restructuring qualies as a trigger event, and
any obligations with a maturity up to 30 years can be delivered. This creates a \cheapest
to deliver" option for protection buyers who would benet by delivering the least expensive
instrument in the event of default. The broad denition of deliverable obligations was intended
to create a standard hedge contract with a wide range of protection possibilities for the credit
risk of the reference entity.
However, the restructuring of Conseco Finance on 22 September 2000 highlighted the
problems with the 1999 ISDA Credit Event Denitions. The bank debt of Conseco Finance
was restructured to the benet of the debt holders. Yet, the restructuring event still triggered
payments from outstanding CDS contracts. To settle the CDS position, CDS holders also
utilized the cheapest to deliver option created by the broad denition of deliverable obligations
and delivered long maturity, deeply discounted bonds in exchange for the notional amount.
To address this obvious lacuna, ISDA modied CDS contracts and dened a new structure
known as modied restructuring (MR). Under this 2001 ISDA Supplement Denition, any
restructuring is dened as credit event. However, the deliverable obligations are limited to
those with maturities within 30 months of the CDS contract's maturity.
In March 2003, ISDA made another change and introduced modied-modied restruc-
turing contracts (MMR) to relax the limitation on deliverable obligations. The deliverable
obligations were relaxed to those with maturities within 60 months of the CDS contract's
maturity for restructured debt, and 30 months for other obligations. Thus, following the 2003
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ISDA Credit Derivative Denitions, there are four types of restructuring clauses: full restruc-
turing (FR), modied restructuring (MR), modied-modied restructuring (MMR) and no
restructuring (NR). For CDS contracts with NR as the restructuring clause, restructuring is
excluded as a credit event: the credit event has to be either bankruptcy or the failure to pay.
To further standardize the CDS market, since April 2009, ISDA does not include restructuring
as a credit event for North American CDS contracts.
To sum up, based on the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivative Denitions, there are four types
of restructuring clauses: FR, MR, MMR and NR. The credit event in all cases includes
bankruptcy and failure to pay. For CDS contracts under FR, the event also includes re-
structuring. Under NR, restructuring is excluded as credit event. The other types include
restructuring as a credit event, but dier in terms of the maturity of the deliverable obliga-
tions, MR being more restrictive and MMR. By 2009, the rules essentially excluded restructure
as a credit event for all North American corporate CDS contracts.
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Figure 1: Rating Distribution Around the Introduction of Credit Default Swaps This
gure plots the credit rating distributions for rms with credit default swaps (CDS) before the
inception of CDS trading and two years after the inception of CDS trading. The credit ratings are
from S&P Credit Ratings. The CDS data are from CreditTrade and GFI Group. There are 901
rms in our sample that have CDS traded at some point during the June 1997-April 2009 sample
period.
49
Figure 2: Credit Default Swaps and Restructuring Clause by Year This gure plots the
distribution of credit default swaps (CDS) restructuring clauses, by year, in our sample between
1997 and 2009. The CDS data are from CreditTrade and GFI Group. There are four types of con-
tract terms related to restructuring: full restructuring(FR), modied restructuring(MR), modied-
modied restructuring(MMR), and no restructuring(NR). For rms with NR as the restructuring
clause, the credit events do not include restructuring, while for the other types, they do. MR and
MMR contracts impose restrictions on the type of bond that can be delivered in the event of default.
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Table I
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Bankruptcies by Year
This table reports the distribution of rms, including those with credit default swaps (CDS) traded, and
bankruptcy events, by year, in our sample between 1997 and 2009. The sample of all rms is from the
Compustat, which includes all companies in the database during 1997-2009. The CDS data are from
CreditTrade and GFI Group. There are 901 rms in our sample that have CDS traded at some point
during the June 1997-April 2009 sample period. The bankruptcy data are from New Generation Research's
\Public and Major Company Database", the UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database (BRD), the
Altman-NYU Salomon Center Bankruptcy List, Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and Moody's
Annual Reports on Bankruptcy and Recovery. The combined database includes all public companies that
led for bankruptcy during the period; it also includes selected private rms that are deemed signicant.
The rst column in the table is the year. The second column in the table shows the total number of U.S.
companies included in the Compustat database. The third column shows the number of bankruptcies in the
year. The fourth column reports the number of rms for which CDS trading was initiated during the year.
The fth column presents rms with active CDS trading during each year. The last two columns report
the number of CDS rms led for bankruptcies and the number of Non-CDS rms led for bankruptcies
respectively. (* from June 2007, ** until April 2009)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year Total # # of # of New # of Active # of CDS # of Non-CDS
of Firms Bankruptcies CDS Firms CDS Firms Bankruptcies Bankruptcies
1997* 9366 50 22 22 0 50
1998 9546 92 58 72 0 92
1999 9545 118 55 106 0 118
2000 9163 158 102 196 1 157
2001 8601 257 172 334 8 249
2002 8190 225 221 547 12 213
2003 7876 156 93 582 5 151
2004 7560 86 58 593 0 86
2005 7318 76 73 629 5 71
2006 6993 49 28 533 2 47
2007 6651 61 9 418 1 60
2008 6223 121 9 375 4 117
2009** 5686 179 1 234 22 157
Total 1628 901 60 1568
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Table II
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Credit Quality
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit downgrades and bankruptcy using a logistic
model. Panel A shows the estimates in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and
all non-CDS rms. Panel B presents the estimates in a sample including rms with CDS and non-CDS
distance-to-default(DD) matched rms. The matched rms are selected as the one with the closest DD. DD is
calculated from the Merton (1974) model described in Appendix B. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity
value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility.
rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to
total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy,
we include credit default swap variables in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one, if the rm is in
the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm has CDS
traded on its debt, one year before month t. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures
the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy after the inception of CDS
trading. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level,
** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Panel A: Baseline Model
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
ln(E)  0:736    0:735    0:710    0:713  
(0:014) (0:014) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:503   0:507   0:713   0:711  
(0:015) (0:015) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  0:017  0:062    1:675    1:626  
(0:026) (0:027) (0:131) (0:131)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:252    0:281    1:331    1:320  
(0:035) (0:035) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:000  0:003  0:038    0:038  
(0:024) (0:025) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm 0:755    2:009  
(0:057) (0:711)
CDS Active 1:371   0:691   0:400   2:373  
(0:045) (0:067) (0:177) (0:729)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 14:75% 15:08% 24:06% 24:18%
N 658966 658966 658966 658966
# of Downgrades(Bankruptcy) 3863 3863 940 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 3:939 1:925 1:492 10:73
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:78% 0:39% 0:06% 0:33%
Sample Probability of 0:59% 0:58% 0:14% 0:14%
a Downgrade(Bankruptcy)
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Panel B: Distance-to-Default Matching
Distance-to-Default Matching
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
ln(E)  0:447    0:462    0:891    0:923  
(0:028) (0:027) (0:113) (0:114)
ln(F) 0:270   0:318   0:865   0:853  
(0:031) (0:030) (0:118) (0:116)
1/E  0:008  0:155    1:971    1:905  
(0:038) (0:042) (0:317) (0:315)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:090  0:614    0:101  0:076
(0:056) (0:073) (0:196) (0:191)
NI/TA  0:700    0:845    0:994    0:331
(0:221) (0:133) (0:259) (0:221)
CDS Firm 1:307    1:809  
(0:100) (0:759)
CDS Active 1:313   0:586   0:773   2:196  
(0:069) (0:083) (0:299) (0:759)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 8:03% 12:02% 23:05% 23:16%
N 119143 119143 119143 119143
# of Downgrades(Bankruptcy) 1469 1469 67 67
CDS Active Odds Ratio 3:717 1:797 2:166 8:989
CDS Active Marginal Eect 1:46% 0:64% 0:04% 0:12%
Sample Probability of 1:14% 1:13% 0:05% 0:05%
a Downgrade(Bankruptcy)
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Table III
Probability of Credit Default Swaps Trading
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit default swaps (CDS) trading using a probit
model. Propensity scores are estimated based on the model parameters. Leverage is dened as the ratio of
Book Debt to the sum of Book Debt and Market Equity, where book debt is the sum of Short-term Debt
and 50% of Long-term Debt. Market Equity is the measure of the Number of Common Shares Outstanding
multiplied by Price. ROA is the rm's return on assets. rit 1  rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past
year. Equity Volatility is the rm's annualized equity volatility. Ln(Asset) is logarithm of the rm's Total
Assets value. PPENT/Total Asset is the ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to Total Assets. Sales/Total
Asset is the ratio of Sales to Total Assets. EBIT/Total Asset is the ratio of Earnings Before Interest and
Tax to Total Assets. WCAP/Total Asset is the ratio of Working Capital to Total Assets. RE/Total Asset
is the ratio of Retained Earnings to Total Assets. Cash/Total Asset is the ratio of Cash to Total Assets.
CAPX/Total Asset is the ratio of Capital Expenditures to Total Assets. DD is the rm's distance-to-default
estimated from the Merton(1974) model described in Appendix B. Rated is a dummy variable that equals
one, if there is credit rating on the rm in month t. Bond turnover is dened as the ratio of bond trading
volume to amount outstanding. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (***
Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.)
Probability of CDS Trading
Leverage 0:146  
(0:041)
ROA 0:021
(0:030)
rit 1   rmt 1 0:049  
(0:023)
Equity Volatility  0:427  
(0:079)
Ln(Asset) 0:403  
(0:015)
PPENT/Total Asset 0:109
(0:097)
Sales/Total Asset 0:018
(0:015)
EBIT/Total Asset 0:169
(0:143)
WCAP/Total Asset 0:132  
(0:035)
RE/Total Asset  0:007
(0:005)
Cash/Total Asset  0:228
(0:192)
CAPX/Total Asset  0:001
(0:355)
DD  0:046  
(0:014)
Rated 0:647  
(0:089)
Bond Turnover 0:087  
(0:018)
Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
R-Square 37:12%
N 520565
# of CDS Events 477
Table IV
Changes in Performance Around the Introduction of Credit Default Swaps:
Dierence-in-Dierence Analysis
This table presents a univariate analysis of changes in rm performance before and after the induction of
credit default swaps (CDS) trading, i.e., from one year before the inception of CDS trading to one year
(-1,1) or two year (-1,2) after the inception of CDS trading. The changes in the performance measures of
CDS trading rms are compared with those of the matching rms. Matching rms are selected based on
propensity scores estimated from the model of probability of CDS trading presented in Table III. M Leverage
is the change in leverage, dened as the change in the ratio of Book Debt to the sum of Book Debt and
Market Equity. M EDF is the change in rm's expected default frequency. EDF is calculated based on the
Merton (1974) model, as explained in Appendix B. M Z -score is the change in rm's Z -score calculated from
Altman(1968). M Rating is the change in rm's credit rating. The number of observations is 477. In the
case of missing data, the number of observations is smaller. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5%
level, and * signicant at 10% level.)
(-1,1) (-1,2)
Variables CDS Firm Matched Dierence CDS Firm Matched Dierence
M Leverage 0:006  0:010 0:016   0:003  0:020 0:023  
M EDF 0:022 0:018 0:004  0:012  0:054 0:042  
M Z-Score  0:405  0:373  0:032  0:424  0:266  0:158
M Rating 0:385 0:260 0:126 0:717 0:642 0:075
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Table V
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Credit Quality: Propensity Score Matching
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy using a logistic
model in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and non-CDS propensity score matched
rms. Propensity score matched rms are selected based on propensity scores estimated from the model of
probability of CDS trading presented in Table III. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is
the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1
is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To
estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy, we include credit
default swap variables in the model specication. CDS Firm equals one, if the rm is in the CDS sample,
and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals one, if the rm has CDS traded on its debt,
one year before month t. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active, which captures the impact of CDS
trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy, after the inception of CDS trading. The sample
period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5%
level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
ln(E)  0:121    0:492  
(0:021) (0:091)
ln(F) 0:111   0:593  
(0:023) (0:09)
1/E  0:251    1:883  
(0:035) (0:269)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:344    0:799  
(0:045) (0:262)
NI/TA 0:054 1:869
(0:096) (1:139)
CDS Firm  0:320    1:819  
(0:065) (0:732)
CDS Active 0:718   1:865  
(0:076) (0:76)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
R-Square 8:72% 27:64%
N 113731 113731
# of Downgrades(Bankruptcy) 2157 82
CDS Active Odds Ratio 2:051 6:456
CDS Active Marginal Eect 1:33% 0:13%
Sample Probability 1:90% 0:07%
of a Downgrade(Bankruptcy)
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Table VI
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Credit Quality: Heckman Correction
This table presents the estimates of the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy using a logistic model
in a sample including rms with credit default swaps (CDS) and all non-CDS rms. The model used is
similar to that in Table II, but adjusts for the selection bias using the Heckman correction method. The
Inverse Mills Ratio is calculated from a probit regression modeling the probability of CDS trading. ln(E) is
the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the
rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is
the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. To estimate the impact of CDS trading on the probability of
credit downgrades/bankruptcy, we include credit default swap variables in the model specication. CDS Firm
equals one, if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS Active is a dummy variable that equals
one, if the rm has CDS traded on its debt, one year before month t. The coecient of interest is that of
CDS Active, which captures the impact of CDS trading on the probability of credit downgrades/bankruptcy
after the inception of CDS trading. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations.
(*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in
parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Downgrades Probability of Bankruptcy
ln(E)  0:662    0:639  
(0:015) (0:022)
ln(F) 0:415   0:646  
(0:015) (0:022)
1/E  0:134    1:403  
(0:029) (0:126)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:345    1:330  
(0:038) (0:109)
NI/TA 0:003  0:032  
(0:021) (0:013)
CDS Firm 0:649    2:277  
(0:059) (0:71)
CDS Active 1:432   2:680  
(0:086) (0:744)
Inverse Mills Ratio  0:706    0:003
(0:051) (0:115)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes
R-Square 14:64% 22:42%
N 657438 657438
# of Downgrades(Bankruptcy) 3723 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 4:187 14:585
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:80% 0:37%
Sample Probability 0:58% 0:14%
of a Downgrade(Bankruptcy)
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Table VII
Impact of Credit Default Swaps Trading on Bankruptcy: Analyst Coverage
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) trading on a rm's probability of bankruptcy
in a sample including rms with High(Low) analyst coverage. Analyst coverage has been used to proxy the
availability of private information. Low Coverage is an indicator for rms with low analyst coverage. ln(E)
is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse
of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and
NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The coecients of interest are those of CDS Active
and CDS Active*Low Coverage. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (***
Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses
are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Low Analyst Coverage High Analyst Coverage Full Sample
ln(E)  0:596    0:713    0:712  
(0:032) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:584   0:711   0:710  
(0:032) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  1:773    1:626    1:660  
(0:209) (0:131) (0:133)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:286    1:320    1:319  
(0:156) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:026  0:038    0:039  
(0:017) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  1:537  2:009    2:021  
(1:006) (0:711) (0:711)
CDS Active 1:986 2:373   2:329  
(1:044) (0:729) (0:737)
CDS Active* Low Coverage 0:134
(0:359)
Low Coverage  0:129
(0:070)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 20:12% 28:71% 24:21%
N 256404 402562 658966
# of Bankruptcies 450 490 940
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:34% 0:32% 0:32%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:18% 0:12% 0:14%
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Table VIII
Credit Default Swaps Trading and Credit Rating
This table investigates the impact of credit rating and credit default swaps (CDS) trading on the probability
of bankruptcy. The hazard model analysis of the probability of bankruptcy is conducted in a sample including
rms with CDS and non-CDS rms matched by their propensity score. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's
equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of the rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity
volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net
income to total assets. CDS Firm equals one, if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. CDS
Active is a dummy variable that equals one, if the rm has CDS traded on its debt, one year before month
t. Unrated equals one, if there is no credit rating on the rm. The coecients of interest are those of
CDS Active, Unrated*CDS Active and Downgrade. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly
observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The
numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(E)  0:492    0:482    0:486  
(0:091) (0:09) (0:091)
ln(F) 0:593   0:577   0:586  
(0:090) (0:089) (0:090)
1/E  1:883    1:674    1:675  
(0:269) (0:266) (0:267)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:799    0:741    0:670  
(0:262) (0:264) (0:259)
NI/TA 1:869 2:251 2:174
(1:139) (1:179) (1:185)
CDS Firm  1:819    1:837    1:780  
(0:732) (0:732) (0:732)
CDS Active 1:865   1:729   1:634  
(0:760) (0:774) (0:775)
Unrated 0:580 0:656
(0:347) (0:344)
Unrated*CDS Active 1:144   1:056
(0:561) (0:558)
Downgrade 1:456  
(0:330)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 27:64% 28:67% 29:74%
N 113731 113731 113731
# of Bankruptcies 82 82 82
CDS Active Odds Ratio 6:456 5:635 6:773
Downgrade Odds Ratio 4:406
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:13% 0:12% 0:11%
Unrated*CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:08%
Downgrade Marginal Eect 0:10%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:07% 0:07% 0:07%
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Table IX
Active CDS Outstanding and Empty Creditor Problem
This table investigates the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) induced empty creditor problem on rm's
probability of bankruptcy in a sample including rms with CDS and all non-CDS rms. The empty creditor
problem is approximated by the logarithm of the total active CDS outstanding during month t scaled by
total debt (Active CDS Outstanding/Debt). CDS Firm equals one, if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero
otherwise. The coecient of interest is that of Active CDS Outstanding/Debt, which captures the impact
of CDS induced empty creditor problem. ln(E) is the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the
logarithm of rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the
rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The
sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant
at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
ln(E)  0:689  
(0:026)
ln(F) 0:652  
(0:026)
1/E  1:533  
(0:104)
rit 1   rmt 1  0:620  
(0:075)
NI/TA  0:076  
(0:023)
CDS Firm  0:582  
(0:211)
Active CDS Outstanding/Debt 0:071  
(0:032)
Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
R-Square 15:82%
N 658966
# of Bankruptcies 940
Active CDS Outstanding/Debt Odds Ratio 1:074
Active CDS Outstanding/Debt Marginal Eect 0:01%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:14%
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Table X
Restructuring Specication of CDS Contracts
This table investigates the impact of the restructuring clause of credit default swaps (CDS) on the probability
of bankruptcy of rms in a sample including rms with and without CDS traded. The empty creditor
problem is expected to be more signicant for rms with No Restructuring as the restructuring clause. In
Model 1, for each CDS rm, we include a variable for No Restructuring CDS, which is the total amount
of active CDS contracts with No Restructuring as the restructuring clause during month t, scaled by total
number of CDS contracts trading on this rm. In Model 2, for each CDS rm, we calculate Modied
Restructuring CDS, which is the total amount of active CDS contracts with Modied Restructuring as the
restructuring clause during month t, scaled by total number of CDS contracts trading on this rm. CDS
Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. The coecient of interest is that
of No Restructuring CDS which captures the impact of CDS induced empty creditor problem. ln(E) is
the logarithm of the rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the
rm's annualized equity volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA
is the rm's ratio of net income to total assets. The sample period is from 1997-2009, based on monthly
observations. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level. The
numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Probability of Bankruptcy
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
ln(E)  0:716    0:717    0:716  
(0:024) (0:024) (0:024)
ln(F) 0:715   0:716   0:715  
(0:023) (0:023) (0:023)
1/E  1:636    1:645    1:641  
(0:132) (0:131) (0:132)
rit 1   rmt 1  1:327    1:327    1:325  
(0:111) (0:111) (0:111)
NI/TA  0:037    0:037    0:037  
(0:013) (0:013) (0:013)
CDS Firm  0:206  0:163  0:432
(0:195) (0:210) (0:255)
No Restructuring CDS 1:315   1:557  
(0:565) (0:599)
Modied Restructuring CDS 0:572 0:858
(0:492) (0:528)
Time Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes
R-Square 24:06% 24:04% 24:08%
N 658966 658966 658966
# of Bankruptcies 940 940 940
NR CDS Odds Ratio 3:725 4:745
MR CDS Odds Ratio 1:772 2:358
NR CDS Marginal Eect 0:18% 0:22%
MR CDS Marginal Eect 0:01% 0:12%
Sample Probability of Bankruptcy 0:14% 0:14% 0:14%
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Table XI
Bank Relationships and Empty Creditor Problem
This table conducts an analysis of the impact of credit default swaps (CDS) on rm-creditor relationships.
The creditor relationships are measured by bank relationships from Dealscan LPC. For each rm on a given
date, we look back ve years for any syndicated loan facilities extended to this rm. Summing over all such
active facilities, we compute, on each date, the number of unique bank relationships. M Number of Banks is
the change in the number of bank relationships from one year before the inception of CDS trading to two year
after the inception of CDS trading (-1,2). M Ln(Asset) is the change in logarithm of the rm's Total Assets
value. M ROA is the change in rm's return on asset. M Leverage is the change in leverage. M Tangible
Asset/Total Asset is the change in the ratio of Property, Plant and Equipment to Total Assets. CDS Active
is a dummy variable that equals one if the rm has CDS traded on its debt. ln(E) is the logarithm of the
rm's equity value. ln(F) is the logarithm of rm's debt. 1=E is the inverse of the rm's annualized equity
volatility. rit 1   rmt 1 is the rm's excess return over the past year, and NI/TA is the rm's ratio of net
income to total assets. CDS Firm equals one if the rm is in the CDS sample and zero otherwise. Number
of Banks is the number of bank relationships in month t. The coecient of interest is that of CDS Active
and Number of Banks. (*** Signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, and * signicant at 10% level.
The numbers in parentheses are standard errors.)
Panel A Panel B
M Number of Banks Probability of
Bankruptcy
M Ln(Asset) 6:291   ln(E)  0:669  
(1:849) (0:026)
M ROA  0:396 ln(F) 0:683  
(2:76) (0:024)
M Leverage 8:581 1/E  1:763  
(5:201) (0:136)
M Tangible Asset/Total Asset  1:586 rit 1   rmt 1  1:339  
(10:84) (0:111)
CDS Active 2:432   NI/TA  0:040  
(1:069) (0:013)
Time Fixed Eects Yes CDS Firm  2:210  
Industry Fixed Eects Yes (0:712)
R-Square 9:75% CDS Active 2:378  
N 496 (0:728)
Number of Banks 0:153  
(0:035)
Time Fixed Eects Yes
Industry Fixed Eects Yes
R-Square 24:32%
N 658966
# of Bankruptcies 940
CDS Active Odds Ratio 10:783
Number of Banks Odds Ratio 1:165
CDS Active Marginal Eect 0:33%
Number of Banks 0:02%
Marginal Eect
Sample Probability 0:14%
of Bankruptcy
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